Why does everyone love India so much?

By:Fatima Rizvi

News reports surfaced last week that an Indian diplomat was arrested and charged with spying for Pakistan. Madhuri Gupta, an IFS-B officer, was posted as Second Secretary in the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, a post where it is alleged that she was cultivated by Pakistani intelligence through a journalist named “Rana”. When it was agreed by the Indian top brass that the matter needs to be dealt with, Ms. Gupta was called to New Delhi on the pretext of preparations for the SAARC Summit in Nepal; when she reached New Delhi, she was promptly arrested. Her arrest revealed a larger spy network at play in double-crossing India; even R S Sharma, the R&AW station chief in Islamabad, is under scrutiny. Now, Ms. Gupta states that she is being framed, and that she neither had access to sensitive documents, nor did she pass them on. She claims she only revealed the overt and officially acknowledged Indian interests in Afghanistan. Well, at least the Indian state is taking note of where its officers and civil servants are out of line.

Read Complete Article: http://fatima-rizvi.livejournal.com/44973.html

21 killed as choppers bomb Taliban hideouts in Orakzai

* 29 terrorists injured, seven hideouts destroyed by fighter jets
* Official says 8 wounded Taliban captured

HANGU/PARACHINAR/ KHAR: Helicopter gunships bombed Taliban hideouts in Orakzai Agency on Sunday, killing 21 terrorists and injuring 29 others, while seven hideouts were also destroyed in the airstrikes.

Sources said helicopter gunships shelled Taliban hideouts in Kool area of Upper Orakzai, killing eight Taliban and injuring 25 others, while three hideouts were also destroyed.

The sources said the helicopters also pounded Taliban hideouts at Ghilju, Ghundaki and Khadezai areas, killing 13 Taliban and injuring four others, as four hideouts were destroyed in the attack.

Meanwhile, according to AP news agency, government official Samiullah Khan said the hideouts hit were in the Dabori area and its neighbouring villages of Orakzai. He added the aerial strikes also destroyed six Taliban compounds.

Independent confirmation of the casualties and the identities of those killed is virtually impossible because the region is remote and dangerous and media access there is restricted.

Separately, AFP reported the Taliban death toll as 13.

One killed, three injured in Swat grenade attack

SWAT: A woman was killed and three persons were injured in a grenade attack at a house in Kabal tehsil of Swat, police said on Sunday. According to details, the house of Roshanzada, member of a local peace committee came under attack at night, killing his daughter-in-law Gul Begum, while injuring three other family members. Investigation Officer Assistant Superintendent (ASI) Sher Gul Khan said that the incident was a result of an old enmity. He said, Roshanzada had named Mian Said Bacha and others in the FIR. Khan said that they have started investigations and are conducting raids to arrest those nominated in the FIR.

It said three fighter jets participated in the attack and destroyed four Taliban hideouts in Orakzai, where Pakistani troops have been pursuing an anti-Taliban offensive since late March, a military spokesman told AFP.

“Jets targeted militants in Dabori, Ghiljo and Khadezai towns,” he said.

Local administration official Sajjad Ahmed confirmed the casualty numbers and said eight Taliban wounded in the airstrikes had been captured. The toll might rise as other suspected hideouts were also pounded, he added.

Fifty blank minutes

By: Shahzad Chaudhry

India’s long-term aim to position herself as a global, major-league player will need the strong moral underpinning of being a stabilising
factor in the region among
all its neighbours

Thimphu is the world’s ‘happiness capital’. While the rest of the world wrestled with the multi-faceted Human Resource Index (HRI) to determine the prosperity potential and quality of life of the people, the Bhutanese coined an entirely separate datum of reference and determined that, along with material progress and its potential within a society, what actually mattered was the accompanying sense of contentment, happiness and conviviality. That is what the prophets ordained. Now, most of the developed world has taken in this concept of a ‘happiness index’ and are providing it with scientific underpinnings for universal applicability.

Consider: the Bhutanese only permitted television to invade their lives in 1999 and it was under the pressure of this modern phenomenon of tourism, and to meet the needs of the tourists, that the internet was allowed in 2008. Do not mistake these Bhutanese for some medieval hermits though. In my brief exposure to the Bhutanese during the 15th SAARC summit in 2008 in Colombo, amongst all the leadership that called on Pakistan’s prime minister, the Bhutanese were the most articulate, well-rounded, but perhaps the most neglected given their small size and insignificant nuisance capacity. International relations, too, are pretty much run on the lines of hierarchical demagoguery. It should matter though that the same ‘insignificant’ Bhutan had trumped Pakistan that morning in staking a claim to hosting the much sought after $ 300 million South Asia Development Fund under SAARC’s aegis. I learnt later from the most reliable source that Pakistan’s was sadly the most forlorn presence at the retreat that morning, as it had lost out to Bhutan.

But those were early days and the leadership has come a long way from those initial faltering steps. The magic of a happy Thimphu seems to have worked its charms when the prime ministers of India and Pakistan met on the sidelines of the SAARC summit to deliver the startling but pleasant news that the two nations may resume their dialogue process after a 17-month hiatus following the Mumbai attacks.

We know what changed India’s mind on the dialogue process, and it is not only the US’s nudging. It seems to have realised, over time, that remaining incommunicado since Mumbai was a failed strategy, as it did not deliver the desired results. India has two other, more dominant, and longer-term objectives. One is its need to remain relevant to the Afghanistan scenario, particularly after the US leaves. Given Pakistan’s natural advantage and perceived pre-eminence, leverage can come only through working with Pakistan to enable a stable Afghanistan. Two, India is aware of its need to repair its image of a recalcitrant neighbour, unwilling to respond positively to Pakistan’s overtures for peace and stability. Its long-term aim to position itself as a global, major-league player will need the strong moral underpinning of being a stabilising factor in the region among all its neighbours, hence the change of tenor at Thimphu. If the Indians were looking for a fig leaf to backtrack from their popular stance, the Pakistanis did well to offer one.

While all seems good on the dialogue front, issues have to be gestated cautiously and very slowly – such being the nature of things between India and Pakistan. There will remain a few unanswered questions and some carefully crafted steps.

The questions first: was this an impromptu one-on-one between the two prime ministers, or was it deliberately built into the process? Given the element of startling surprise that the Pakistani foreign minister evinced, it seemed more the former. Again, given that nothing out of India ever comes without due process, it may have been a well-deliberated move from the Indians, in which case it must have left the accompanying Pakistani establishment dumbfounded. Or, could it be that given the absolute lack of capacity in the straitjacketed and closeted system of functioning within the establishments on both sides – proven repeatedly after a failed history of sustaining dialogue and absolutely no results to show – the two political leaders showed some spine to break away from the yokes of the establishment’s control and did what statesmen do: chart a newer territory and move beyond the logjam? The 10-minute walk on the preceding day seems to have sealed the move as the only way possible to move on. If so, they deserve all our praise and kudos and, more importantly, support in both countries to strengthen their hand against what is surely going to follow – an incessant campaign to fail their hand.

What went on between the two when alone for those ’50′ minutes? For the sake of Prime Minister Gilani, one hopes that it was a known event, and thus had been adequately briefed at the level of the establishment. But was it so? If not, there are going to be some busy hours spent in Islamabad trying to relive what was actually said in there. One, of course, assumes that the Indians had their act together, but if that too was an unplanned event for them, there is likely to be enough for them in that discussion to please their palate back home.

A well-developed conspiracy theory can be made to identify those 50 minutes, but one avoids the temptation. Let the success be savoured for as long as it can be. But there is one of the two likelihoods or a combination that a fly on the wall may have been privy to. “I am unable to do what I desire till you help me do it. Success on Indo-Pak will strengthen my hand to bring in the most desired structural changes that we know are essential to tame the non-political forces and to enable a freer hand to deal with all inimical players in our midst. In recompense, when we sign the almost ready agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek, you can be certain to see an immediate follow-up on Afghan transit trade and bilateral trade. We will also take up the Kashmir issue from where we left off under General Musharraf,” Gilani may have said. That will mightily please the Indians.

As a parting thought, Musharraf’s four-point formula on Kashmir was not a sell-out. It entails the initiation of an evolutionary process which would have negotiated itself through to the doable which would be sustaining and stabilising. Let us give the devil his due.

Now for the carefully crafted steps: bring the entire establishment on board, develop a bi-partisan political consensus, educate and mentor public opinion, retain some spine and stay the course. And, finally, learn from the Bhutanese.

New Delhi on alert as embassies warn of attack

By Pratap Chakravarty

NEW DELHI – Thousands of police and paramilitary soldiers guarded New Delhi’s markets and shopping centres Sunday after foreign embassies in India issued warnings of imminent militant attacks.

The US, British, Australian and other Western embassies issued urgent alerts advising their nationals to avoid busy parts of the city, where blasts in upmarket shopping areas in 2008 killed 22 people.

Commandos and armoured cars guarded metro stations, shopping malls and crowded market places across the sprawling city of 16 million people.

Police with automatic weapons patrolled Delhi’s four most popular shopping districts, and explosives experts used tracker dogs to sweep sensitive areas.

New Delhi police spokesman Rajan Bhagat urged residents to inform the police of “any suspicious object, person or vehicle”.

Canada and New Zealand were among the countries warning citizens to take precautions in New Delhi, a rapidly expanding and chaotic city that wants to bolster its international image before hosting October’s Commonwealth Games.

The US embassy posted an advisory on its website on Saturday warning: “There are increased indications that terrorists are planning imminent attacks in New Delhi.”

It named popular city centre shopping zones such as Connaught Place as “especially attractive targets for terrorist groups”.

The high commissions (embassies) of Britain and Australia issued similar warnings, prompting India’s Ministry of Home Affairs to insist its security precautions were satisfactory.

In February, a bomb exploded in a packed restaurant popular with travellers in the western city of Pune, killing 16 people, including five foreigners.

It was the first major incident since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks in which 10 Islamist gunmen launched an assault on multiple targets in India’s financial capital, killing 166 people.

India blamed the Mumbai attacks on the banned Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, worsening already tense diplomatic ties with its neighbour.

Previous deadly blasts in Delhi have been blamed on shadowy home-grown Islamist groups.

Security concerns about the Commonwealth Games have been rising, with some Australian athletes questioning whether they would participate and advising their families to stay at home.

In the latest incident, two low-intensity bombs went off last month at a cricket stadium in the southern city of Bangalore ahead of an Indian Premier League match.

New Delhi has promised “foolproof” security during the Games, which will involve 8,000 athletes.

The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 4: The View from Kabul

By: Jay’s Blog

Amid a surge of Western troops into Afghanistan, a raging Taliban insurgency and Pakistan’s attempts to consolidate its influence in the country, Kabul is being pulled in many directions. The government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, now at the beginning of its second five-year term, is trying to secure its own future as well as balance the ambitions of other key players, all while preventing the already war-torn country from becoming a proxy battleground.
A growing Taliban insurgency and a surge of U.S. and allied forces into the country are shaking things up in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital. There, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, now in his second five-year term, has been formally in power since 2002 and in elected office since 2004. After several years of being portrayed as an American lackey, perceived more as the mayor of Kabul than the president of Afghanistan, Karzai has tried to break out of this mold and secure his own political survival. This at a time when the Taliban have emerged as a major force and the United States has made it clear that its commitment to Afghanistan is limited.

Karzai’s problems have only escalated since the Obama administration took office. Relations began to sour in the run-up to last year’s Afghan presidential election, when elements in Washington began searching for alternatives to Karzai, who was being criticized for corruption. But with years of experience in managing his country’s many regional warlords, Karzai was able to quickly align with all major ethnic groups and ensure his victory in the election, despite the entire process being marred by charges of fraud.

Tensions with Washington throughout the election helped Karzai create his own political space within the country, space that he sought to expand even as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry behind the scenes expressed doubts about Karzai’s viability as an effective American partner. In recent weeks, Karzai took his efforts to a different level by accusing the United States of engaging in fraud during the Afghan election, triggering a strong response from Washington. His move paid off. After a couple of weeks of high tensions, senior U.S. officials, including President Barack Obama, moved to ease the strain, calling the Afghan president an ally and partner. With almost all of a second five-year term still ahead of him, Karzai is as much a political reality in the country as the Taliban.

Objectives and Problems

The main objective of the current Karzai regime is to maintain as much of the existing political structure as possible and to maximize its position within that structure. This is a system that has been crafted and staffed in large part by Karzai and his inner circle, and thus it bolsters their position disproportionately. But because the Taliban are also a political reality, Kabul must work to achieve meaningful political accommodations that will serve to stabilize the security situation in the countryside.

To maximize its leverage, Kabul must do this rapidly. The surge of U.S. forces into the country and the money, aid and advice that the Karzai regime receives will never be more abundant than it is right now, so with his power at its height, Karzai must reach these political accommodations as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, Kabul has two main problems. The first is that it has limited means to compel the Taliban to negotiate on the requisite timetable while the Taliban have every incentive to hold out on any meaningful talks. The Karzai government is working with interlocutors (mostly former Taliban officials who still retain influence) to negotiate with the jihadist movement, but the question is the pace at which real progress can be made. At the heart of these negotiations is the question of who speaks for the Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s single largest demographic segment, accounting for more than 40 percent of the country’s population.

Nor will political accommodation come cheaply. The Taliban will not be won over with a few Cabinet positions. The current discussions include the need for constitutional change that will allow more room for Islamic law and perhaps an extra-executive religious entity that controls the judiciary. Just how much of a stake the Taliban would have in the government and what shape that stake would take remains to be seen. In any case, it will likely require substantial concessions in Kabul.

The second problem is that Kabul’s efforts to negotiate with the Taliban are being pulled and manipulated from all sides. This is the real challenge for the current regime – balancing all the outside players who are trying to shape the negotiations. Kabul needs to prevent the already fractious and war-torn country from becoming a proxy battleground for the United States and Iran or Pakistan and India (among other countries). The difficulty of maintaining this balancing act – while also maintaining local support – is increasing by the day.

Kabul’s closest allies are the United States and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Although Washington and Kabul do not always see eye to eye, and Karzai is trying to distance himself from the United States in order to downplay the puppet image, the United States and other coalition countries provide the foundational support for his government as well as security in the countryside. And while the United States likely views Karzai as a convenient scapegoat as well as an interchangeable political part, it is trying to demonstrate some confidence in the Afghan president. At a major tribal meeting in Kandahar on April 4, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, head of the ISAF, was notably silent, allowing Karzai to speak and lead the discussion.

Aside from the United States, Pakistan is the next biggest player in Afghanistan, and because of its own links to the Taliban, it has far more practical leverage than the United States does in shaping the negotiations (of which it has every intention of being at the center). Pakistan’s arrest of senior Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is now believed to have been carried out to disrupt direct negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul in which Baradar is thought to have been engaged. A strong Pakistani hand in Afghanistan is a longstanding reality for Kabul, but Islamabad is maneuvering to consolidate its influence as a planned American drawdown in 2011 approaches.

But Pakistan’s resurging role in Afghanistan places Karzai in a difficult place between his eastern neighbor and its regional rival India. New Delhi has invested a great deal in development and reconstruction work in Afghanistan since 2002, and Kabul will need to balance this aid with the need for Pakistani assistance with the Taliban. And complicating all this, of course, is India’s alignment with Russia on the Afghanistan issue.

Perhaps more critical than the Indo-Pakistani struggle over Afghanistan is the U.S.-Iranian contest. Although Iraq is the main arena for Washington’s struggle with Tehran, the focus of the contest is shifting to Afghanistan, along with the U.S. military effort. Iran also has considerable influence to its east, with deep historical, ethno-linguistic and cultural ties that it has adroitly established and cultivated not only among its natural allies – ethno-political minorities opposed to the Taliban – but also among some elements of the Taliban themselves. Though this influence is not decisive (the Taliban have their own interests, and many groups opposed to the Taliban are close to Karzai and the West), Tehran has the ability to influence events on the ground in Afghanistan, and an eventual settlement of the war cannot happen without Iranian involvement. From Karzai’s point of view, he has to balance his alignment with the United States with the fact that Iran is always going to be Afghanistan’s western neighbor, long after U.S. and NATO forces have left his country.

This is really the ultimate problem. On its best day, Afghanistan is poor, lacks basic infrastructure and is economically hobbled. With weak domestic security forces and little to offer the outside world, Kabul can only hope to continue to entice more international aid while playing all the various countries with vested interests in Afghanistan against each other. Incorporating the Taliban into the political framework will be especially important over the next few years, but when and if that happens, the balancing act will continue to be played by any central government in Kabul.