Area 14/8: The Upside to Divisive Power-play

By Z. FEROZE
Area 14/8

While western scholars deem it necessary to permit a revolution in Pakistan, the question of whether or not we require a messiah has often boggled the intelligentsia. While nationalism and tradition hailed in Balochistan and Punjab respectively, a ghastly series of repercussions garnered results such as the killing of PTI leader Zahra Shahid Hussain in Sindh. Common sense dictates that Sindh is desperately in need for a political messiah to alleviate the town in lieu of target killings, ethnic violence harboring separatism and a scraped social fabric and security. The general disputation among the intelligentsia regarding the failing political situation of Karachi, the hub of the most influential political party in Sindh, has been to chalk out the cause and effect of the town’s social tumult. Without doubt, MQM is an important power-player that has repatriated ethnic devises and fuelled ethnocentrism of the Muhajir, directly as well as indirectly. Reduced to victimized manipulation, the people of Karachi have fixated on this politics of division and extortion. With an alarming number of people losing their lives to a lack of social security, the solution to a monochromatic political representation of Karachi has been wishy-washy. The Election of 2013, however, reworked the political dynamics of Karachi and managed to considerably compromise the strain exacted by the MQM influence on the region.

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Shahzain Bugti called US embassy at the time of arrest

QUETTA: The US embassy in Islamabad on Friday confirmed that the provincial chief of Jahmoori Watan Party (JWP) Shahzain Bugti had communicated with them at the time of his arrest two days ago.

Jamhoori Watan Party’s provincial chief Shahzain Bugti arrives at the Anti Terrorism Court in Quetta.

Talking to Express News, US embassy spokesman Alberto Rodrix said that Shahzain had contacted an official in the American embassy.

Rodrix said that Bugti had discussed his arrest with the official. The spokesman said said that the US respects Pakistani law and that Bugti’s arrest is Pakistan’s internal matter.

Shahzain Bugti, the grandson of late Nawab Akbar Bugti, was arrested by paramilitary troops on Wednesday when they found a huge quantity of arms and ammunitions from vehicles in his convoy during a snap check at the Buleli check-post on the outskirts of Quetta.

Shutter-down strike

The JWP called for a shutter-down strike in Balochistan today to protest the the arrest of Shahzain Bugti.

Various parts of Balochistan observed the strike.

In Quetta, business centres remained closed and few vehicles ventured on to the city’s roads. Tight security measures were in place to avoid any untoward incident, with political parties and trade organizations also supporting the strike.

Shahzain Bugti’s arrest: Shutter down strike being observed in Balochistan

JWP activists forcefully closed shops and resorted to aerial firing in a few areas in Quetta, with police confiscating their firearms.

Petrol shortage hits Punjab, Balochistan

Scarcity of petrol is causing inconvenience to the citizens in various cities of Punjab and Balochistan as various petrol pumps have announced unavailability of petroleum. According to details petrol scarcity has perturbed the citizens in various cities of Punjab including Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad and Gujranwala as a result consumers are facing severe shortage of petrol and long queues of consumers were witnessed at city petrol pumps.

Similarly petrol scarcity has also hit various cities of Balochistan including provincial capital Quetta, where some petrol pumps were selling petrol at the prices of Rs200 per liter. Concerned authorities were of the view that after Eid vacations they were not receiving the required supply of petrol that’s why petrol scarcity has emerged in the city.

Check Indian, Afghan Dams For Floods In Pakistan

Indian company controls dam on Kabul River, tens of dams control flow of Kashmir water into Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan

Flood gates of Afghan Sarobi Dam, Indian Baglihar Dam were opened to drown Pakistani plains

Two US allies, the puppet regime in Kabul and the ‘strategic ally’ in New Delhi, declare water war on Pakistan

The tragedy one again raises question marks on the US double game against Pakistan in the region

Melting glaciers have nothing to do with this tragedy; it also doesn’t explain why Kabul river surged

It’s not as if the clouds dodged borders and focused on Pakistan only. Pakistan’s water flows from Indian-occupied Kashmir and from US-occupied Afghanistan. A natural deluge should have shown some spillover effect into Indian and Afghan regions adjoining Pakistan. It is interesting that a second and a third wave of floods is expected in Pakistan when there’s no rain to justify it. Where is the water coming from? Here’s a perspective by Mr. Zaid Hamid, a security analyst at BrassTacks, and Ms. Gulpari Mehsud, a researcher at PakNationalists.com. [PakNationalists.com]

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan-There is a very sinister aspect to the floods in Pakistan that no one is discussing in the media. While there were rains and flooding in some rivers of the country, the size, scale and the gush of water suddenly pumped into these rivers defies logic. This is especially true considering that rains have slowed down since the breakout of the floods on 29 July.

It is two weeks since the rains stopped but water continues to rise in the rivers Indus and Chenab. There was no flooding in India or in Afghanistan. Never before have rivers in all the provinces of Pakistan flooded at the same time without a similar act affecting the upstream, the source. While some parts of the country, like some areas of Khyber Pakhtun Khwa saw flooding in 1929, the simultaneous floods covering all of Pakistan and in all of the rivers flowing in from Afghanistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir is something truly unprecedented.

This speed and quantity of the gushing water and the short span of time in which it picked momentum preclude the possibility that water from melting glaciers are solely responsible for the floods.

There is no evidence that suggests that glaciers decided to melt at a faster speed just in time for the heavy monsoon rains.

There is every likelihood that what we are seeing today is that the Indians and the US-backed regime in Kabul are using water as a weapon for the first time to deluge Pakistan. There is no doubt about it.

From an initial look at the data, it seems that a natural spill of heavy rain was exploited by releasing water reservoirs in Indian-occupied Kashmir and on river Kabul. Let’s remember that the Met Office in Pakistan had already forecast heavy rains almost ten days before the first downpour. Different people received this news in different ways. Pakistani politicians, inept and incompetent as usual, slept over it. The anti-Pakistan terrorists based on Afghan soil and supported by several countries used this information to exacerbate terror against Pakistani citizens in the southwestern province of Balochistan, knowing that the State machinery would be distracted.

Interestingly, even when it comes to water, it is Indians where are sitting to the left and right of Pakistan’s borders. The dam on Kabul river is handled by Indian personnel, while tens of dams choke Pakistan from the side of occupied Kashmir.

RIVER KABUL

In February, the Obama administration organized a meeting for senior government officials in Kabul and Islamabad who handle agricultural issues. The meeting was strangely held in Doha, Qatar, on US request. The agenda was to force the Pakistanis to grant agricultural concessions to the US-propped government in Kabul, without Pakistan getting anything in return.

But in the meeting, Mr. Zahoor Malik, a senior Pakistani bureaucrat leading the Pakistani delegation, raised the issue of an Indian company with close links to the Indian government building a dam on river Kabul near the border with Pakistan. It is not clear what the Americans and Karzai’s officials had to say about this. There is a track record, however, that the incumbent pro-US government in Islamabad has often swept such issues under the carpet in order not to jeopardize Washington’s support for the Zardari government.

All major rivers flowing into Pakistan including the Indus are blocked by Indian-built dams.

US and British officials often defend India and dismiss Pakistani concerns as ‘conspiracy theories.’ Some Pakistani analysts accuse elements within US government and intelligence of using Afghan soil against Pakistan.

But imagine this: India, a country that faces a debilitating conflict over Kashmir with Pakistan, goes to build tens of small and medium sized dams on all the rivers flowing down to Pakistan, and everything is supposed to work out smoothly? Not possible, even theoretically. But luckily Indian actions on the ground more than strengthen Pakistani concerns.

After the first wave of floods, the other rivers were flowing normally and no extraordinary rains followed. But suddenly Chenab and Indus Rivers overflowed and the flow picked up speed, turning into a flood. India’s Baghliar Dam in occupied Kashmir opened its flood gates to cause a tragedy in the plains of Pakistan [Sindh and Punjab]. While Sarobi Dam – the Indian-maintained dam near Kabul – controls the flow of Kabul River entering Pakistan. The same thing happened here. Monsoons did not lash Afghanistan and there was no flooding there of any magnitude. But again, strangely, water flowing from river Kabul into Pakistan dramatically picked up speed as water levels increased turning into a flood. The speed with which this transformation occurred could have happened only because of one of two reasons: massive rains in Afghanistan or because Sarobi Dam released large amounts of water over a sustainable period of time.

PAKISTANI POLITICIANS

ANP, a US-allied party with strong links to Kabul and New Delhi and ruling the Pakistani northwestern province, has always opposed the construction of the Kalabagh Dam which would have saved thousands of lives and property had it been there. The ANP has argued that building the dam would drown the city of Nowshehra. Ironically, ANP’s lie was exposed when not only Nowshehra but also Charsadda drowned without the Kalabagh Dam being there and thanks to the artificial floods created in Kabul River by ANP’s Indian and Afghan patrons.

[Earlier this year, Washington and New Delhi came to ANP's defense on the Kalabagh Dam project by lobbying the World Bank to refuse Islamabad's request for funding the dam. The Bank obliged and said it can't fund the project due to Indian objections.]

OUR RESPONSE

How Pakistan responds to this latest Indian water war and aggression is something that remains to be seen. What is confirmed is that the incumbent pro-US government in Islamabad is useless when it comes to defending the Pakistani interest. To be fair to this government, this unusual situation in Islamabad started under former President Musharraf and continues with the current ‘elected’ government with amazing continuity. This water aggression has proved more lethal than the TTP [so-called Pakistani Taliban] and the BLA insurgencies, both of which were started from the Afghan springboard to punish Pakistan.

Pakistan has taken another serious hit, more from its corrupt rulers than external enemies. These Indian Dams now need to be destroyed. India has declared war on us by exploiting and orchestrating these floods.

Pakistan in Ten Years: The Optimistic View

THE HUFFINGTON POST

This past week, Foreign Policy listed Pakistan as # 10 on its list of failed states. Factors receiving particularly high scores were factionalized politics, group cleavage, security apparatus and foreign intervention. Not everyone agrees. Christine Fair, at Georgetown, gives a more positive view, emphasizing recent moves toward a relaxation of the military’s role in government and increased democratization.

So is Pakistan a failed state, or on its way out of the morass in which it presently finds itself? This is the first of two posts. In this one, I want to mention three reasons that I see for optimism in Pakistan – the second post will describe some reasons for pessimism, although even mentioning such a topic has the feel of applying for a contract to truck coals to Newcastle.

Any discussion of Pakistan’s political future should start with Balochistan. Balochistan is the central focal point for many of Pakistan’s problems, including some that might seem unrelated. In truth, Balochistan may be Pakistan’s biggest problem of all, and it is one to which I am not sure American observers pay nearly enough attention. Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan, comprising more tan 40% of the nation’s total land area. It is also the poorest, and the most sparsely populated, with only 8 million people … and enormous wealth in natural gas, copper, and other minerals. The country’s hold over the province has been challenged literally since its inception: in the 1947 partition, Balochistan was not included in the new state of Pakistan. A few months later, Balochistan joined Pakistan through a referendum. Deepening on whom you ask, that referendum was fair and transparent or manipulated by the Pakistani Army. What is uncontested is that within a very few years, an established pattern of the national government withdrawing mineral wealth and putting nothing back into the province in the way of investment had resulted in enough resentment to give rise to an organized separatist movement. Since that time there have been five separatist campaigns (including the present one, dated from 2005), of which the most important of these was in the 1970s. The conflict lasted four years, and was ended when the Pakistani government led by Sulfiqar Ali Bhutto, initiated a brutal military campaign with the direct assistance of Iran (the precise extent and nature of that assistance is the subject of dispute, like almost everything else in this story.)

Balochistan’s continuing separatist movement is a festering problem for Pakistan. For one thing, the Pakistani government and many Pakistanis are convinced that India is providing support to the movement, through a series of consular offices along the Iranian-Baloch border and by more direct means such as training and the provision of equipment through RAW, India’s intelligence service. These claims are not only a staple of Pakistani politics, they are a central element in Pakistan-India relations, and a complicating factor in the effort to secure Pakistan’s cooperation in combating the Taliaban and other jihadist groups.

The most significant assertion of Indian involvement was made during a meeting of the non-aligned states in Sharlm-el-sheikh in 2009. At that meeting, the Pakistani government announced that it had delivered a dossier of evidence to its Indian counterparts, and at various times Pakistani government and military spokesmen have made dark statements about photographs and captured operatives. But none of this supposed evidence has ever been made public. One can also turn to the equally non-specific October 2009 allegations by Major General Salim Nawaz, inspector general of the Frontier Corps paramilitary force in Balochistan, or this statement in March 2010 by Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik claiming “solid evidence” in the form of the discovery that Balochi separatists were found to have weapons manufactured in India. These allegations are invariably the response to calls for greater cooperation in clamping down on the groups responsible for the “11/26″ attacks in Mumbai, for example.

And these are only the respectable, government-issued conspiracy theories; in the popular press the stories become lurid, indeed, involving allegations of Indian, British, American, and Israeli support for the separatists (as well as foreign sources for all terrorist activities in Pakistan, generally.) What is certainly true is that leading figures in the separatist movement have said that they would welcome assistance from India, most notably in a 2009 interview of Bramadagh Bugti, a Bugti tribal leader and primarily leading figure in the separatist movement. There was also a statement by a leader of the Balochi movement in exile (in the United States) explicitly calling on India to assist the cause. Of course, the fact that such assistance was requested does not mean that it was forthcoming – one might even think that the repeated calls for aid indicate the absence of that very aid. Moreover, the fact that Balochi separatists might seek outside assistance, including assistance from India, is hardly surprising. In general, separatist movements will accept assistance from anyone, and given Iran’s track record and Afghanistan’s current condition it is difficult to think where else the Balochis might turn.

This background is how we get to the present situation in which Taliban and Al Qaeda influence in Balochistan is said to be growing. Tha main city of Balochistan is Quetta, which is widely regarded as one of the primary command and control centers for Taliban forces fighting in Afghanistan; their support draws on both Pashtun tribal ties and anti-Pakistani government attitudes. The U.S. has been pressuring Pakistan to send its army into Balochistan. One reason the Pakistani government resists the idea is that they recognize that such a move would not simply be a matter of moving into friendly territory to find the enemy, it would be an invasion of a separatist province in order to go after a sub-group within that larger population. It is understandable, perhaps, that the Pakistani government is not inclined to undertake such an operation.

So what’s the good news? The good news is that, instead of launching what would undoubtedly be a bloody and destructive military campaign, the government of Pakistan may finally be paying serious attention to Balochistani complaints. Tie 2010-2011 national government allocates twice as much money for Balochi development as was in this year’s budget, with emphases on roads and schools. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan is building a modern port at Gwadar (in Balochistan). And the much-discussed plan for a natural gas pipeline from Iran into Pakistan would further spur development in the region. A network of affordable private schools is emerging,
prominently featuring the City Schools system whose efforts in Balochistan are directed by a retired Brigadier General of the Pakistani Army.

None of this is likely to provide any comfort for American forces or policymakers in the short term. In the medium term, however, perhaps there are signs that the government of Pakistan, after 60 years, is finally going to make some kind of serious effort to persuade Balochis that they have some reason to want to be part of the country. If that were possible, it would be a very good thing, and the mere fact that the current government – I might say even the current government – is undertaking a serious program of development in the province is a reason for optimism. And in the long run, American and American-supported Afghanistan’s interests are at stake here, as well. An awful lot of observers – myself included – believe that any stable outcome will include areas of Taliban control in Afghanistan, for example. The key in that scenario is to separate the Taliban from Al Qaeda and similar jihadist groups. By the same token, the key to any long-term stability in Balochistan – with all its ramifications – lies in creating a sufficient incentive for the people of Balochistan to want to be part of a stable Pakistan rather than seeing their only hope in separation achieved by force of arms with any help that they can get. “Hearts and minds” is a tired phrase, but a government that cannot capture the hearts and minds of the residents of its own largest province has a serious problem. The Pakistani government’s moves toward addressing that problem are a very good sign. There is no guarantee of success – this may be too little, too late after 50 years of accumulated resentment – but as a policy direction, I repeat, it is a very good sign.

Another reason for optimism regards relations with India. The Pakistani government, and Pakistanis generally, are showing signs of finally becoming exhausted by the strain of making every policy, budgetary decision, and political conversation in terms of fearing India. True, as recently as 1965 Indian and Pakistani forces fought pitched battles within the city limits of Lahore (after Pakistan’s disastrous attempt to infiltrate Kashmir). The Lahore Museum features a piece of a fuselage from an Indian plane and a display of rifles in use in the 1960s, along with a frankly bewildering assortment of other things (the museum deserves a description in a separate post.) But 1965 was 45 years ago: to put that in perspective, that’s like looking at World War II in 1990. This is not to say that there are not genuine conflicts between India and Pakistan. The Kashmir issue is real, and it is partly about control over water sources, as is the conflict over Siachen glacier. Presently, high-level meetings are currently underway between Pakistani and Indian government ministers. As usual, Pakistan is accusing India of involvement in Balochistan and India is denying the claim, while India is claiming that Pakistan has been slow to move against the perpetrators of the Bombay attacks. Which brings us back to where we started, but a more productive attitude toward Balochistan could easily point toward a more productive attitude in dealing with India. Which in turn improves the willingness and ability of Pakistan’s government to crack down on non-Balochi extremist groups, and so on. It’s a logjam, but that means that progress in one key place could loosen the mass and break the logs apart into separate, manageable problems.

What other reasons could there be for optimism? The initial, tentative, early appearance of something like political maturity might be an answer. Psychologically this is a remarkably young country (again, that museum exhibit sticks in my mind — it included both ancient artifacts from the Indus Valley civilization and … a collection of all of Pakistan’s stamps with their first day covers.) It is discomfiting to use anthropomorphic terms like “psychology” about a nation, but in Pakistan one gets a palpable sense that even the elites are working this out as they go along with nothing to build on from the past.

One place this shows up is in the country’s politics. In the past, I have been repeatedly told, the members of the elite class (that’s not my term, that’s the universally employed term among Pakistanis) did not pay much attention to politics and almost never voted. Explanations vary: antidemocratic attitudes, a sense of futility, a sense that as long as they were doing all right nothing else mattered. But in general, goes the wisdom of local political scientists, the best educated, wealthiest, most established elements of civil society treated politics as something best left to others.

That may be changing. It seems there is only now a generation coming onto the stage that realizes that a national identity cannot be based solely on being the enemy of India, nor on the forcible suppression of large segments of the country, nor can “government” be reduced to a military force and some minor bureaucrats if the state and its economy are to have a hope of survival There seems to be growing awareness of the need to grow up and become a real country. More Pakistanis then ever before, I think, recognize that the generals’ wars have brought neither victory nor stability, and whatever is the precise relationship between the ISI and the Haqqani network, the idea of maintaining jihadist groups as “lashkers” (tribal warriors) for use in future Pakistan-India conflicts seems to be finally wearing out its welcome, as well.

In general, moreover, there are rumblings that significant numbers of Pakistanis may finally have had their fill of autocrats and kleptocrats, and especially of dynasties. I have literally been unable to find anyone with anything positive to say about Zardari, but what is more striking is that I have been almost unable to find anyone with anything positive to say about any past or present political leader. I have spoken with college students, faculty members, journalists, drivers, tour guides, shop owners, lawyers, self-proclaimed Muslim fundamentalists who want to see shariy’a imposed on all Pakistan and with self-proclaimed liberal secularists – the unanimity is truly striking. “Mr. 10% was the name for the last term,” one driver told me, “now it should be Mr. 50%.” A spirited discussion ensued: is the right number 50%, or 80%, or perhaps 90%?

Against this backdrop of total and well-earned cynicism there is slowly beginning to emerge a sense that new and different forms of politics are needed. A newly formed party, “Mustaqbal” (the Future”) claims to be made up of non-politicians, businessmen and community leaders and other civil society figures disgusted with the existing system and determined to find another way. The party is brand new (it has yet to field its first candidates), and some of its key policy positions are only available in Urdu. In an interview posted on-line, the party’s leader Chairman Nudeem Qureshi called for an end to military operations by the Pakistan government against forces inside Pakistan. Not a view designed to endear him to NATO, to be sure, and Qureshi seemed to be dodging some tough questions in the interview. But the idea of a new generation of political figures whose concerns are specifically about Pakistan’s internal affairs and who are eager to disassociate themselves from corruption, control by the military, and foreign entanglements could be yet another good sign. Whether this particular party is the real thing, or whether it goes anywhere, is of course a matter for speculation.

In the optimistic version, where might that leave Pakistan in ten years? With NATO forces gone and Afghanistan stabilized by a division between Taliban and other forces, expanding economic development in Balochistan, a restoration of stability and a withdrawal of Army forces – and an end to martial law – in other areas of the country, an emerging political leadership committed to the creation of stable civil society by delivering goods and services to underserved areas, cooperation with India in anti-terrorism operations, water distribution, and development, improved energy resources by way of importation for Iran, expanded commercial relations with China, and the 90,000-strong network of private schools expanded to 200,000 strong … Nothing is going to make the problems go away, but it is quite possible to imagine a situation ten years from now far better than the present one. If only because it could hardly be worse.

This is not only just speculation, and not only just one view, it is only one speculative view based on views collected in one city. It may be a lot easier to be optimistic in Lahore, I suspect, than in other parts of the country

‘Balochistan law and order bad due to US presence’

* Abdul Wasay says RPPs should be established in province

By Mohammad Zafar

QUETTA: The law and order situation in Balochistan is bad due to the presence of the US and NATO forces in the region, Balochistan Senior Minister and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) leader Maulana Abdul Wasay said on Thursday.

He made these remarks while addressing a press conference. Wasay told the media that the Balochistan Planning and Development (P&D) Department would complete 349 new projects and 393 development projects at the end of this fiscal year.

The JUI-F leader said that the provincial government would spend Rs 26 billion on 812 development projects during the next fiscal year. The Balochistan senior minister said that the federal government had promised to provide Rs 120 billion as gas royalty arrears and the funds would be provided in two annual instalments of Rs 10 billion each. He informed the media that the Balochistan government had succeeded in securing additional resources from the federal government in the recently announced National Finance Commission (NFC) Award.

Wasay not only favoured but demanded the installation of a rental power plant (RPP) in gas and coal-rich Balochistan to meet the demands of some orchard owners and agriculturists. Instead of establishing a power plant fired by gas and coal, the Balochistan senior minister said that the province required RPPs to tackle the energy crisis. “The government will spend Rs 9.8 billion for maintenance of roads,” he said.

Grenade attack kills two girls in Peshawar

Ghalib Sultan

The incident took place in the Khazana area where small children were playing on a building site. — Photo by AFP

Two young girls were killed on Wednesday (May 12, 2010) when a hand grenade exploded while they were playing on the outskirts of Pakistan’s northwestern city of Peshawar, police said. The incident took place in the Khazana area where small children were playing on a building site. The act reminds locals of recent news of an acid attack on three girls – sisters on their way to Killi Pandrani – in Kalat, Balochistan in late April, which created new terror in the hearts of the Baloch population, resulting in a shutter-down strike throughout Kalat in protest of this heinous act. This most recent acid attack occurred 14 days after another acid attack targeted two girls – again, sisters – who were shopping in Dalbandin, Balochistan. All victims had their faces badly burnt.

It now seems that the terrorist criminals are again on the offensive against poorly defended, hapless and helpless citizens of Pakistan – picking them out at their weakest, and eliminating them bit by bit. Moreover, the Taliban have now resorted to the use of a ‘weapon’ that has been part of Pakistan’s rural culture and its traditional society for decades – acid attacks were frequently used to target ‘liberal’ women who ‘disobeyed’ the ‘orders’ of a rural jirga or a panchayat. While a grenade attack kills, an acid attack severely maims and disfigures the victim, leaving him or her alive to feel the pain and live through it miserably. Since the 1990s, acid attacks also crept into urban centers of Pakistan, and the womenfolk of this country had no response to this other than donning the repressive ‘burqa’ to escape such victimization. In effect, such a response was more of an acknowledgment of defeat in the backdrop of a negligent and ignorant government, and an unconcerned male population.

Coming back to the title story, senior police official Mohammad Karim Khan told AFP that “an unknown person threw a hand grenade at a house under construction in Khazana, killing two girls aged four and six”. A three-year-old boy and six-year-old girl sustained injuries and were taken to hospital in Peshawar, he added. No-one has claimed responsibility for the attack so far. It may be assumed that the ‘house under construction’ belonged to a tribesman who relocated to Peshawar after the Talibanization of – and pursuant military operations in – the tribal areas. While this reveals a different economic situation than that of other refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons), the plight of insecurity and lawlessness that Pakistani tribals are suffering from refuses to abate.

Baloch nationalist groups protested against the acid attacks, blaming ‘hidden hands’ for crimes against women and demanding that culprits be brought to the book. –Online Photo/Naseer Ahmad Kakar

Peshawar lies on the edge of Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt, which Washington has branded a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda, and has been hard hit by bomb attacks and shootings blamed on Taliban militants. From brazen attacks against law enforcement, security and intelligence installations, to threatening schools and barber shops, this new format of terrorism may be taking the Pakistani security forces by surprise. Instead of mounting coordinated attacks on institutions, the terrorists are now targeting individual civilians – hapless and insecure on their own – by means of grenades and acid attacks. Drive-by shootings, called ‘target killings’, and kidnappings-for-ransom were already the attacks-of-choice of the Taliban; it achieved the purpose of creating terror, it allowed the terrorists to meet some of their ends (like financing) and it also creating new, time-tested and  workable relations between the Taliban insurgents and everyday criminals. In the enforcement of their millennial and dysfunctional ‘Shariah’ system – which has little to no grounding in the teachings of Islam – Taliban militants imposed the penalty of amputation on those charged with thievery. In late April, Khaista Jan, Azam Shah and Razim Shah were ‘arrested’ by the Taliban in Orakzai Agency, and on May 5, 2010, it was announced that the right hands of these three tribesmen were amputated ‘in accordance with the principles of Islamic law’ as proclaimed by a Taliban ‘court’. This incident took place in the remote Ghaljo village of Orakzai, which is controlled by the Taliban. “A Taliban court ordered the cutting off of the right hands of three local tribesmen in Orakzai tribal region after finding them guilty of theft,” a police official told AFP on condition of anonymity. These tribesmen were later admitted into a Kohat hospital – whose doctors literally saved their lives – where journalists and reporters were able to see firsthand the gruesome justice of the Taliban. Orakzai is the latest district in northwest Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal area to have witnessed an anti-Taliban operation by the military, following US pressure to eradicate extremism.

Victims of Taliban justice: Khaista Jan, Azam Shah and Razeem Shah in a Kohat hospital

Pakistan is waging offensives across the tribal belt, fighting against home-grown Taliban blamed for a violent bombing campaign that has killed 3,300 people since July 2007. There are a lot of questions and counterclaims regarding this number – some say it is more, others say it is less – because the Pakistan Army has not allowed the independent media to cover its military operations in the tribal areas. Juan Zarate, a Senior Advisor at the CSIS, purports that more than 8,600 Pakistanis were killed in 2009 directly or indirectly because of the War on Terror.

However, it seems that the terrorists and their criminal cohorts are now shifting to a new methodology of importing terror to the cities and villages of Pakistan; indiscriminate targeting of individual civilians. This seems to be a novel and more dangerous way of pursuing a terrorist agenda; target those who are least secure, and those who have the least protection; attack immediately and retreat immediately; claim no responsibility, but repeat the steps from the start in another place at another time. With a nationwide ban on the display of arms, and another ban on the issuance of new arms licenses, it is extremely difficult for Pakistanis to develop ways and means for their own personal protection privately.

Unless and until militant leaders and commanders are brought to justice (captured, arrested or killed) and unless the misguided teachings and fiery rhetoric of Islamic extremism, fundamentalism and associated terrorism are abandoned by the popular will of the people, it seems that the Pakistani state and Pakistani people have no defense from this new battleground that has been dug out by ‘the enemy within’. The people of Pakistan need to question what brand or sect of Islam allows the disfigurement of women’s faces by throwing acid on them, or the killing of innocent children with grenades and bombs while they are playing. Within these arduous yet unavoidable questions, Pakistan may find the answer not only to the Taliban conundrum, but also find solutions to the quagmire of the extremism-fundamentalism nexus based in Pakistan’s lawless areas that now churns out terrorists like Faisal Shahzad – Western-educated liberal Muslims who suddenly resort to the path of fundamentalist extremism under a psychological sentiment of globalized, indirect oppression. The onus is on the state – the government, the military, and the law enforcement and security agencies – to bridge this ‘trust deficit’ between them and the Pakistani civilian populace, who are already under attack by the Taliban and are unable obtain recourse from responsible state apparatuses. Within these questions of religion and faith, crucial questions regarding modern state formation are contained; if the state cannot perform its basic responsibility of providing the people security, due process of justice, law and order, and economic prosperity, then the ranks of the Taliban will keep on swelling because their main aim is to transform from a ‘state within a state’ to the actual state itself – by overthrowing the liberal democratic institutions of Pakistan. The Pakistani state must also question whether it can continue its negligent and ignorant behavior furthermore, or whether it should ‘step up’ and assert its rightful place as the sole administrator of the country’s functions, and as the only legitimate actuator of violence. If these questions aren’t answered soon, then we are looking at a future where most Pakistani women have disfigured faces courtesy of acid attacks, and where most Pakistani men are devoid of one limb or the other.

Encountering fundamentalism

By: Nizamuddin Nizamani

Extremist Islam is encroaching deeper into the Thar Desert and almost all district and tehsil headquarters of Sindh and Balochistan, where large numbers of seminaries, with new buildings and equipped with every kind of infrastructure, have been erected during the last few years

Lethal suicide blasts in Lahore on March 13, 2010, which killed more than 60, including seven soldiers, shows the resilience and capability of the fanatics to strike in highly secured zones in the urban areas. Previously, they have attacked several security offices in Lahore, Rawalpindi and other cities in the Punjab and the rest of the country. This reminds me of the warnings issued by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which claimed that, in case of military action in the tribal areas, they would avenge these actions in Punjab. Their threats have proved right and they have brutally targeted almost all provincial headquarters.

This ruthlessness in the name of religion is worthy of condemnation and needs to be countered by all possible means. Of late, based on media reports, there seemed complacency within the general public as the thought prevailed that the terrorist network of al Qaeda and its offshoots had been considerably weakened. The people heaved a sigh of relief, but the relief proved temporary.

We need to revisit our current state of affairs. Mere use of force is not enough to counter the menace of terrorism; instead an integrated approach could have been adopted, which should include discouraging the fanatic schools of thought in the country. We need to begin with the exploitation of technology and mass media that have been supporting fanaticism in the name of religious education. About eight full-time religious TV channels have been allowed to bombard our screens, indoctrinating ‘religious’ material day and night. About 30 other channels in different languages do the same partially, with early morning and late evening slots reserved for this purpose. In addition, cable operators make it their religious duty to play religious videos on religious events.

Reputed TV anchors have totally ignored this issue of paramount importance. Had they been responsible, they could have spared some time from political mudslinging and could have educated their viewers about the increasing threat of fanaticism. This ignorant attitude provided space to the Zaid Hamid breed of anchors, who supplement extremist ideology by their own interpretation of history and religion, as well as patriotism. Mobile technology has also been exploited to broadcast provocative messages through cheaper SMS packages.

Second,the mushroom growth of religious seminaries stands unchecked and unaccountable. Despite the ceremonial madrassa reforms and registration, a large number of seminaries, while admitting young students for free residential education, reportedly ensure that their families should not have a TV set and receive no newspaper at their home. They ensure that these young students remain isolated and should not have access to the outside world.

Third, the religious syllabus, including published and oral lessons, has not been revised. According to various reports, religious provisions are mixed with rigid tribal values andinnocent minds cannot distinguish between these two separate and totally different things.

Fourth, the ingenuous Tableeghi Jamaat, despite its noble cause of preaching religion, has been indirectly instrumental in strengthening jihadi Islam in remote and far-flung areas of the country. Through their excellent communication skills, they strategically access tolerant communities and cultures. Afterwards, the jihadis follow and recruit the youth, which had been motivated to sacrifice their time, energy and wealth by the Tableeghi Jamaat.

Archives show similar stories during the Afghan jihad against the erstwhile Soviet Union. John K Cooly, in his book The Unholy Wars, revealed surprising links between jihadi recruitments in Egypt and in other Arab as well as African countries. Jihadi nurturing in the tribal areas and the Swat Valley in NWFP, followed by the south of Punjab seems like a replica of the Afghan jihad and a repetition of the Afghan jihad strategy.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa opines that after the south of Punjab, this lethal game will be repeated in Sindh. She fears that the people of Sindh may have the complacency of an old and tolerant culture, but Sindh is bound to change given the current activities of jihadis there. Her fears are proving correct, as extremist Islam is encroaching deeper into the Thar Desert and almost all district and tehsil headquarters of Sindh and Balochistan, where large numbers of seminaries, with new buildings and equipped with every kind of infrastructure, have been erected during the last few years.

One of the major signs of this change isthe reported forceful conversion of minority Hindus to Islam, especially the women. Civil society activists claim that during February 2010 alone, 11 young girls from the Menghwar community to Mithi and Samaro area, were kidnapped, converted to Islam and forcibly married to their abductors. This may be the tip of the iceberg.

Concerning Balochistan, a new report bemoans that the Baloch social fabric, once highly tolerant in religious views, has been encroached upon and during the last few years, popular English and Urdu daily newspapers have been replaced by jihadi literature. English medium schools and tuition centres in Punjgoor, Turbat, Gawader, etc, have been closed down and a large number of Arabic-oriented madrassahs have been opened.

Finally, despite an apparent fight against a dogmatic and intolerant paradigm, practically we have allowed favourable breeding grounds for the terrorist networks we are facing today and paying a huge cost in term of precious lives and collateral damage.

We must address the above-mentioned issues and counter fundamentalism in Pakistan through an effective, integrated and comprehensive strategy. Addressing all these aspects is paramount; otherwise fundamentalism has the capacity to render Pakistan a failed state.