Quixotic Doings

Pakistan is in international headlines today not because of any investigative reporting by some foreign journalist but by the actions of Pakistanis themselves. First the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau volunteered to be interviewed on a TV channel. Not only did he take the opportunity (conveniently provided by the anchor) to refute all the allegations against him but he also did a super job of blowing his own trumpet. Perhaps carried away by his own eloquence and affected accent he declared that the daily corruption in Pakistan was Rupees 15 billion. He did not back up this assertion by any data or statistics or any research or analysis report. This statement by a top Pakistani official was swallowed hook, line and sinker by a public ready to believe the worst and a world that simply loves helping Pakistan do it to itself. Couldn’t this former Navy man turned Mr. Accountability go and brief the government that appointed him or does he have no faith in them? His seemingly bold action has endeared him to the public albeit briefly before the focus shifts back to his own track record with a business tycoon now facing the courts? Quite rightly the Prime Minister has summoned him to explain his conduct and if the Prime Minister has a spine he will haul him over the coals and then get to the facts. Almost immediately after the summons the man has given a public ‘explanation’ to pacify the government!!

Second there is the latest from an enterprising Pakistani journalist who is making a name for himself by unearthing ugly truths and making them public. His latest foray was into the tax returns of the Cabinet and the Members of Parliament and the report that he has produced tells the world that 75% of the peoples representatives do not pay taxes with some not even registered as tax payers and most of the rest paying very nominal amounts. His report is the subject of debates on TV and the international media has lapped it up. The countries that dole out their own tax payers’ dollars and pounds to us are not amused — in fact they must be thinking hard. Aren’t tax returns confidential documents? Is there any forum or methodology for media – government interaction when sensitive issues are involved or are ratings and personal ambitions more important than the country’s image? What effect would the release of this information have on those who are paying taxes? The Parliamentarians are rightly furious because the taxes on their meager salaries have not been indicated and nor have other things like advance tax and withholding tax that are compulsory deductions? How can tax be deducted from your salary without making you a registered tax payer with a national tax number?

Recent international surveys have ranked Pakistan among the most corrupt countries in the world, the worst governed and even among the worst places to be born in. One such report placed Pakistanis among the happiest people but now a columnist has written an article in which he tells us the difference between being happy and cheerful thereby debunking the notion that we are happy. Yet another writer informs us that the highest in the judicial hierarchy singled out a journalist for flowers after that journalist escaped an assassination attempt and then asks the question why only this journalist was sent flowers and not the countless and faceless others who have met violent ends.  Shouldn’t someone investigate a bomb that is so shoddily fixed that a conveniently standing bystander spots it and alerts the intended victim and a bomb planter who does not detonate it when the victim is sitting on the bomb and instead waits for it to be spotted? Must we make fools of ourselves?

By Ghalib Sultan

The Right Path Is The Democratic Path

Not everyone supports democracy in Pakistan; some for religious reasons, others either don’t know what it means for them, while some see bad things in it because of the deceptive ways of the electoral class. That, however, shouldn’t come as a surprise. In every country and society, one encounters opposition to democratic ideas for some reason or another. The real issue in Pakistan is that those coming to power, on account of popular representation and because they keep referring to their own glorified role in democratic struggles, hardly have any political or ideological commitment to democracy.

Exposing their hypocrisy can be the first step towards building our democratic future. The bigger challenge, however, is how we can defeat their using use of democratic means – i.e., popular support – to betray the popular mandate. Let us be clear, the popular mandate is not about acquiring power but rather about articulating the public good, securing rights and the defending lives and properties of citizens. Pick up a manifesto of any political party in the governing coalitions, and one will will see these grand objectives emphasised over and over again. A mandate is not a right to rule but rather a social contract, a promise or commitment one makes when asking people to support one’s programmes and policies when running for election. Fair and free elections are a rarity in Pakistan, and so individuals, groups and parties have used violence, coercion, fraud, and money to procure popular support. The democratic means of achieving power, often claimed by victors of elections in Pakistan, may not stand the litmus test of being free, fair or untainted of corruption.

The same has been true of our four military dictators – all of whom vowed to build ‘genuine’ democracy, or create a social and economic base for it, while displacing the electoral elite. But what they did instead was to destroy each and every institution and norm that could make the democratic progress of Pakistan, smooth, sustainable and deep. The history of military dictators is characterised by deceit, institutional decay, political fragmentation, moral and social rot, (that produced polarisation), insurgencies and alliances of the state with violent ethnic and religious groups.

So, what is the alternative if we find ourselves between two options – military rule and ‘democratic’ demagogues misrepresenting democracy? The answer is that we must learn from our own experiences, a lot more than we learn from the struggles of other countries. Two lessons are important and must form the foundational ideas of our social and political thinking. One, there is no alternative to democracy. Second, that democracy comes in stages and through struggles – and never is it offered on a platter or as a gift.

How can we go about this struggle, which must be both through debating universal ideas and their relevance to our society and time (it also has to come through the concrete actions of members of civil society)? For this, we must educate our people and struggle harder than we have in the past. I am afraid, a diverse, plural, large and complex society like Pakistan cannot be governed peacefully without democracy – a democracy, which is not hijacked by demagogues, murderous violent groups that enter into political compacts or by those who have no respect for law, judiciary or accountability.

This raises a million-dollar question: how to get rid of those who have false representation and falsely represent democracy? I wish I had a simple answer. It has to be through persistent, patient work for civic education, support of judiciary, accountability and rule of law. The road to democracy is long and the journey can be tiring, but this the only road that leads to progress, stability and civilised governance.

FULTON’S FULMINATIONS

By: Ghalib Sultan

George Fulton, aka George the foreigner, who became a Pakistani (thanks to a dictator’s Prime Minister) has been true to form. After nine years, he has written two columns (Express Tribune March 2 and 3) to say Khuda-Hafiz in our words, and Good-bye in his, to Pakistan. In these columns, he has castigated Pakistan’s military and intelligence services and the ‘mullahs’, implying a nexus between the three that, in his opinion, is doing in Pakistan. This is what most westerners say, and they say so when their designs are thwarted and they come up against the bulwark that defends Pakistan, and in doing so, earns their wrath. What Pakistanis consider as their assets are made out to be liabilities and attacked relentlessly. Small wonder that our larger Eastern neighbor, and the Western-backed segments to our west, join the chorus; even adding new twists and insinuations. George the ex-Pakistani was no exception.

To be fair to the Pakistani George (assuming that he has not turned in his citizenship) he has some good things to say about Pakistan-at least about those with whom he could relate and interact. He, however, considers Pakistan in isolation probably because it is Pakistan that he experienced first hand or because he wants to do so deliberately. He does not say anything about the brutal massacres of Muslims and Christians in India by crazed fanatic Hindu mobs. Nor does he talk about the brutality of the Hindu dominated military and para-military forces in Kashmir-the rapes, the tortures and the killings. These do shape opinions and reactions in Pakistan even if the naked aggression by India that broke up Pakistan in 1971 is forgotten-not that it is or ever will be. He is critical of our nuclear weapons but says nothing about what drove Pakistan to get them. He writes about Pakistani society but this society is no different from societies elsewhere in the world-all have warts, injustices, corruption, vice, drugs, violence, exploitation, haves and have-nots; the good, the bad and the ugly. And like many other societies, Pakistan is going through a transitional phase.

This does not say that there are no problems in Pakistan. There are serious problems that the state is addressing against great odds. The average Pakistani, like the average person in all other countries, wants peace, security, health care, education and the opportunity to work and play without fear for the security of his loved ones. It is the resilience of this average Pakistani that has enabled the state of Pakistan to survive and make progress. Fulton, while fulminating, did not have much to say on this. He also seems to have forgotten that the destabilization and radicalization of Pakistan is in direct proportion to the US/NATO aggression in Iraq and Afghanistan without any reason-in fact, on the basis of distorted facts. Small wonder then, that the US and NATO stock is so low in the Muslim world-and falling.

Khuda-Hafiz George, and may you be safe from dangers wherever you go to find what you did not find in Pakistan. Pakistanis will not miss you, nor will you miss them.

PML-N threatens PPP with ‘other options’

By Zia Khan

ISLAMABAD: Two days after expelling the PPP from its Punjab government, the PML-N Sunday said it would go for ‘other options’ if President Asif Zardari could not take firm measures to curb the unbridled corruption.

“The PML-N will continue to monitor Zardari administration’s performance very closely” – PML-N Spokesperson Ahsan Iqbal.

A spokesperson for the party, however, did not specify in a statement the ‘options’ the PML-N believed were available to it.

“The PML-N will continue to monitor the Zardari administration’s performance very closely,” said Ahsan Iqbal, the party spokesperson and a member of the National Assembly. “It will play its democratic role to check massive corruption prevalent in the government if no concrete steps are taken (to eradicate it).”

Though Iqbal did not mention it explicitly, in recent months the party has been alluding to the possibility that it might call for fresh parliamentary elections this year.

Iqbal said that the party would not have expelled the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) from the Punjab government had President Zardari lived up to his promises of eradicating corruption and improving governance.

“The Zardari administration’s broken promises and poor performance made it inevitable for the PML-N to part ways with the PPP in Punjab,” the spokesperson said.

Corruption, inflation, unemployment and poverty had crossed all limits and were the outcome of the politics of patronage and bad governance pursued by the federal government, Iqbal added. He said that the PML-N went out of the way to help the federal government in implementing the reforms agenda which the country needed desperately but the Zardari administration exhibited no seriousness and concern.

“As a result there was no option left with the PML-N but to disengage with PPP in order to clearly demonstrate that it is not a party to the Zardari administration’s politics of plunder and loot,” said Iqbal.

Iqbal said that the Charter of Democracy (CoD) – an agreement two parties signed back in 2006 – made it binding on both the groups follow politics of good governance and to fight corruption.

“Zardari should have done that, if he wanted us to continue to support him,” the spokesperson explained.

Article 63-A was originally introduced as part of the 14th Amendment to the constitution in the 1990s, during the second term of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister, largely to help prevent the kind of changes in party loyalty that had made coalition politics so volatile during the so-called “decade of democracy.” It was hoped that by making crossing party lines illegal, coalitions would be more stable.

Why Hosni Mubarak Is Still Better Than Pakistani Rulers

By Ahmed Quraishi

Hosni Mubarak in his speech a few minutes ago has proven he and his regime, including his new Vice President, do not understand and respect their people.

But there is one thing he said that resonated with me because I’ve seen it in his government for the past three decades.

I’d like to point out this one thing because it is very relevant to Pakistan’s political and military leaderships.

Mubarak said at one point in his speech, ‘I will not allow myself to be subject to foreign interference’. At another place, he added, ‘I will live and die in Egypt.’

Great words and they certainly don’t justify his three-decade long tight grip on power, the corruption and now the refusal of the regime to understand its people.

But I watched President Mubarak say these words and thought about Pakistani leaders who, since the 1990s and until now in 2011, have become shameful instruments of foreign meddling in Pakistan. Mubarak is supposed to be a bigger foreign stooge and yet he never allowed foreign meddling in his country, and he won’t now even in his defeat.

Even in his defeat Mubarak declared he will not subject himself to foreign diktat. And that he will die and be buried in Egypt and won’t escape for safety and in some haven in Jeddah, Dubai, London and New York.

For Pakistan’s ruling elite, these cities have become alternate capitals of Pakistan.

Mubarak refused to entertain offers to move to Germany or Saudi Arabia or Dubai. Sure, things can change in the future, but I read in the Arabic-language media that if worse came to worse, Mubarak thinks he could hand over power and move to his house in the resort city of Sharm el Sheikh, but never leave and die outside Egypt.

This is significant and let me explain why.

Even when Egypt under Mubarak was very pro-American and pro-Israel, it kept its national pride. Egypt was taking American aid but refused to accept American meddling. Mubarak knew Washington needed his country in order to protect Israel. So he delivered on that count but never permitted the Americans to meddle in Egyptian politics. When President George W. Bush rolled out his democracy agenda in the Middle East after 9/11, Mubarak was instrumental in failing it [along with the Saudis]. He just won’t have it. Mubarak refused to allow the Americans to establish direct contact with Egyptian politicians or engineer any kind of internal change.

Egypt made peace with Israel but only because Egyptian nationalists were disappointed at what they saw as stabs in the back by Arabs and Muslims [For example, rich Arabs refused to bail oput Egyptian economy enough despite Egypt fighting Israel in four wars on behalf of all Arabs. Egypt was also shocked to see Pakistan in 1956 supporting the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, and other Muslim nations like Turkey and Iran not supporting Egypt in wars with Israel.] All of this shaped the psyche of the Egyptian ruling elite and intelligentsia and helped push Egypt toward peace with Israel under American guarantees.

But Mubarak didn’t allow his people to become American or Israeli puppets, and limited all forms of political interference.

I can recount many occasions when there were frictions between Cairo and Washington over one thing or the other and the mainstream US media was unleashed – as usual – to ridicule, harass or intimidate Mubarak and Egypt. But Mubarak won’t have any of it. The Egyptians have always been very protective of their national pride.

Compare that to Pakistan. Every regime, from Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif to Pervez Musharraf to Asif Zardari, has handed over Pakistani citizens to foreign governments without an iota of national pride.

Some of them moved to Jeddah, Dubai, London and New York. Most of them have their wealth and properties abroad. Mr. Musharraf added something new to this shameful history when he launched Pakistan’s first political party on foreign soil, in London and Dubai. And now most Pakistani politicians consider it kosher to conduct important political meetings outside Pakistan. Mr. Zardari has introduced another first: high-level meetings with foreign governments that relevant Pakistani government departments, like the Foreign Office, know nothing about. We have ambassadors and national security advisers who are appointed to protect the interests of foreign governments.

The regime’s corruption and ruthlessness are the reasons why Egyptians want change. But Egypt progressed a lot under Mubarak’s regime, unlike the Syrians or the Iraqis.

For all of his ties to the Americans and Israelis, Egypt under Mubarak remained staunchly proud. As a Pakistani, I certainly don’t want to see a Mubarak in Pakistan. However, we do need a Pakistani ruling class with the same sense of pride and history, one that won’t turn its country into an experimentation zone for foreign powers.

Hosni Mubarak and the Egyptian regime made peace with Israel but never allowed any foreign power to come and abuse Egyptians or bomb them through CIA drones. This honor exclusively belongs to Pakistan’s ruling elite.

Iraq Prepares For War With Iran

Strategy Page

The Iraqi Army is hustling to get ready to deal with Iran, by the time the last 50,000 U.S. troops leave at the end of the year. Increased oil production, and oil prices, has made it possible to recruit more troops, and equip more combat divisions. Particularly noteworthy is the creation of Chemical Defense Regiments, with the goal of one of these units being assigned to each combat division over the next few years. The only neighbor known to have chemical weapons is Iran. Iraqi diplomats spend a lot of time trying to improve relationships with Iran, but just in case things go south, the Iraqi military is preparing for the worst.

While Iraq has sought to obtain a lot of American weapons, particularly tanks, artillery and combat aircraft, it’s been easier, and faster, to get Russian type gear from Russia or East European nations. A lot of this stuff is newly made, but most of it is Cold War surplus. These vehicles and artillery are cheap, a lot of older Iraqis are familiar with them, and they are as good as anything the Iranians have.

The Iraqi ground forces currently have nearly 200 infantry and tank battalions, organized into over 70 brigades and 17 divisions. There are a lot of independent brigades, and divisions are still waiting to receive artillery and armored vehicles and support units. Meanwhile, troops spend a lot of time performing security tasks, to aid the effort to track down the few remaining Sunni Arab terrorists.

By the end of the year, the army will have about 230,000 troops. They will not be as well as equipped as during Saddam Hussein’s tenure (1960s-2003), but they are better trained. This is important, because Iraqi troops have long been the least effective in the Arab world, largely because of poor leadership. The war with Iran in the 1980s changed that, but Saddam purged most of the competent new leaders, soon after, as he feared they would lead a coup against his disastrous rule (he was probably right.)

The Iraqi Army has come a long way since 2003, when the old, Sunni Arab dominated force was disbanded, and a new one, loyal to a democratic government, and led by newly recruited and trained officers, was built from scratch. Because of that, the Sunni Arabs loyal to Saddam (and Sunni Arab rule) fought a four year terror campaign. One response was the army forming the best troops into special “intervention” units. This resulted in an army organization consisting of one “Intervention Corps” and three other corps of lesser quality. Most divisions have four brigades, and a total strength of about 12,000-15,000 troops.

The 1st Intervention Corps consists of the two motorized, one infantry and one armored divisions. One of the motorized corps is the also known as the Reaction Force Division. This is considered the most effective division in the army, and one to be used for the most difficult situations. Think of this corps as the new “Republican Guard.”

Another independent security forces is the 1st and 2nd Presidential Brigades (for guarding senior officials), which is controlled by the armed forces headquarters.

The other three corps are named after the part of the country they are based in.

The Northern Corps has two motorized divisions and an infantry division. Two divisions of Kurdish troops serve as mountain divisions, but lack a lot of heavy weapons (tanks and artillery).

The Central Corps is the area around Baghdad, and the thinly populated Anbar Province to the west. This corps has two motorized divisions, one infantry division and one commando division.

The Southern Corps has three infantry divisions, with another infantry division planned. One of the existing divisions is motorized and another is designated a commando division,

There are other security forces, mainly four divisions of Federal Police, the Counter-Terror Command (with seven commando battalions and support troops), the Border Police and half dozen battalions worth of “Emergency Police” (SWAT, riot control) distributed around the country. These other security forces are nearly as large as the army, but are not as heavily armed, or trained for heavy combat.

The navy is currently, basically a coast guard. The air force consists of about a hundred transports, helicopters and recon aircraft. The 50,000 U.S. troops are mainly deployed in bases around Baghdad, and northern cities.

Even the army does not have a lot of heavy weapons. There are lots of newer armored hummers. Thousands of new armored vehicles are on order. Compared to Saddam’s force, the NCOs and officers (mostly from the Shia Arab majority), have less time in uniform, but are better trained. The Iraqis have learned a lot about fighting from their American mentors, but there are still a lot of bad habits (corruption, especially) that degrade combat effectiveness.

Quit war on terror, eradicate corruption, pay tax

By: Sohail Khattak

KARACHI: The government can draw Pakistan out from the present turmoil if it drags itself out of America’s war, wipes out corruption and ensures everyone pays tax, said Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan on Tuesday.

Tehreek-e-Insaaf chief Imran Khan addresses media persons at Karachi Press Club on Tuesday.

Addressing a press conference at the Karachi Press Club, the sportsman-turned-politician said corruption has reached its peak and is vigorously dragging the country downhill.

About Pakistan’s role in the war against terrorism, he said we have to quit if we want to stabilise the country. “As long as we’re fighting someone else’s war, we will face the nastiest conditions as people now believe that we are fighting a war against the kuffar (non-believers).

About tax collection, Khan claimed that 90 per cent of the parliamentarians do not pay tax. “We are driving the country deeper into the abyss of foreign loans and 65 per cent of the revenues generated through the tax are being spent on covering the expenses of these loans.”

“If Rs5 billion can be collected for Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital and the flood victims in a year, then why cannot people give tax to the government,” he questioned.

During the question-answer session, a journalist asked why he was called a “clean-shaved maulvi”. Khan smiled and said, “Maybe because I was against the Lal Masjid operation and the operation in the tribal areas.”

Steel Mills: Fear of SC intervention restrains privatisation

By: Shahbaz Rana

ISLAMABAD: The Privatisation Commission has had to temporarily shelve the plan for the privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) after it failed to circumvent the Supreme Court’s judgment and was found to be intruding in the mandate of other ministries.

The Privatisation Commission’s board, which met under the chairmanship of Federal Minister for Privatisation Senator Waqar Ahmed Khan, failed to convince stakeholders on either selling almost a fifth of PSM or getting a mandate for the revitalisation of the sinking giant, according to sources who attended the meeting.

Sources added that Khan tried his utmost to convince the board members to go forward with PSM privatisation. However, certain members raised the issue of the Supreme Court’s judgment on the privatisation and its latest position on alleged corruption.

Khan told The Express Tribune that the commission “does not want to sell the shares” and added, “what it wants is a turnaround by enhancing the production capacity from one million tons to seven million tons.”

When asked why he tried to intrude upon the mandate of other ministries, he said that the moment “you go for raising money, the Privatisation Commission comes in.”

Sources said the Privatisation Commission cannot carry out the revitalisation, which is a mandate of the Ministry for Industries and Production. The prime minister has also constituted a ministerial committee – the cabinet committee for restructuring – and Khan was trying to infringe upon the mandate of both the Ministry for Industries and the cabinet’s committee, they added.

Pakistan Steel Mills was a profitable entity during the last regime but due to alleged political appointments at the top, it has been incurring losses worth billions of rupees. The Privatisation Commission has proposed selling a 20 per cent stake to foreign investors and giving them management control.

According to an official handout, “the Privatisation Commission Board discussed the capacity building, plant optimisation and turnaround of the Pakistan Steel Mills.”

The release further states that the board, in consultation with the management of respective entities and the concerned ministries, gave a go-ahead for inviting expressions of interest (EOIs) for the appointment of financial advisers for Pakistan Post Offices, National Power Construction Company, Heavy Electrical Complex (HEC) and the listing of Islamabad Electric Supply Company (Iesco) on the stock exchange for its initial public offering (IPO).

The financial advisers will evaluate these entities and suggest the best possible option for taking the transaction forward keeping in mind their value addition, including corporatisation, revamping, revitalisation, management outsourcing through public-private partnerships and divestment of shares through domestic and international capital markets.

The board also formed various transaction committees for these entities comprising Privatisation Commission board members to monitor the progress for ensuring utmost transparency and satisfaction of all respective stakeholders, said the release.

Khan said that the government was determined to restrict itself to policymaking and not running businesses.

Breaking free from the quicksand

Ameer Bhutto

It is said that whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. With each passing day the Zardari administration grows more rash and reckless in the absence of any sane restraining political force. This recklessness vividly illustrates a schizophrenic pattern of behaviour that borders on political suicidal tendencies which threaten to derail a lot more than just their power joyride. The latest examples of their out-of-control egos are the clandestine promulgation of the NAB Ordinance on September 16 and the appointment of the new NAB Chairman in contravention of the rules and laws. These acts of government go beyond defiance of laws. They are an open challenge to the rule of law and the state institutions entrusted with safeguarding them.

All that seems to matter to those who have sneaked into power, not on a mandate based on merit but on a sympathy-vote after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, and are wreaking havoc with the nation with their pyromaniacal conduct, is their own draconian will. Rule of law, judicial verdicts, the constitution, the imperatives of democracy and decent transparent conduct be damned. The fact that nearly every significant move this government makes is challenged in court is itself a moral indictment against them.

If the new NAB Ordinance was issued on September 16, why was it kept secret till several days later? Why was the prime minister kept completely in the dark about it? Parliament alone enjoys the direct mandate of the people to make laws and govern. Why was the new NAB law not placed before it instead of being issued as an ordinance by the president, who was elected not by the people but the members of parliament? Governance through presidential ordinances is an undemocratic attempt to bypass the will of the people vested in parliament to establish one-man dictatorship. Predictably, the legality of this ordinance has been challenged in court.

Similarly, the appointment of Deedar Shah as the new NAB Chairman reeks not just of blatant nepotism but a poorly veiled effort on the part of this NRO government to escape accountability for their corruption and other crimes by appointing a handpicked man who might shield them from the law. The Supreme Court verdicts in the Al-Jihad and NRO cases make it clear that the NAB Chairman is to be appointed after meaningful consultation with not just the leader of the opposition in parliament, but also the chief justice.

In fact, the government sought more time from the Supreme Court to make this appointment on the specific grounds that such consultations had not as yet been undertaken. Having bought time, the government went on to abuse the privilege by appointing their handpicked man without meaningful consultations with anyone. Apart from the legal problems with Deedar Shah’s appointment as Chairman NAB, there are political and moral issues as well. This man thrice contested on a Peoples’ Party ticket for a Sindh provincial assembly seat, winning twice. He is still well known as a confirmed jiyala and everyone knows where his loyalties lie. How can he be expected to be impartial in cases against his party leaders?

Keeping in mind the glaringly obvious violations of the rules and requirements of impartiality, how could the government possibly conceive that it would get away with his appointment? It too has been challenged in court. But the more intriguing question is why would they want to take actions that are bound to land them in thicker soup than they already are in? Does this not illustrate a comprehensive and arrogant disregard for the due process of law? Does this not point to an all-encompassing political death wish?

This is not good governance. This is not even bad governance. It is an unabashed rape of law, democracy and state institutions and it has been going on for two and a half years. This government has gotten away with it because it has been given carte blanche to do as it pleases under the preposterous justification of preserving ‘the system’.

During the tenure of this government, real opposition has existed for just one day; March 15, 2009, the day of the long march, which produced results within hours. Other than that, the government’s sleaze has flowed pretty much unimpeded. Even before the devastating floods, the people had voluntarily abdicated their democratic responsibility of holding their leaders accountable. But since the floods they are engaged in a day-to-day battle for survival and issues of legal and constitutional propriety couldn’t be further from their minds. As such, the government now feels totally unrestricted in pursuing its agenda of corruption.

How long can this go on? The answer is very simple; it will go on for as long as the people are willing to bear the pain and suffering in silence. The Zardari administration has done more than anyone or anything since the Ayub/Yahya days to push the country to the precipice of revolution. If the people wish to survive the corruption and incompetence that characterise this government, they have to make a last ditch-stand against this government, just as it has made a last ditch-stand against the rule of law. The people have been badly let down by their leaders in government and opposition alike. They will have to wipe the slate clean and begin afresh, with a new order, a new vision, a new ideal, led by clean, able and competent leaders who must rise from amongst their ranks rather than from a hijacked dynasty.

Does all this sound like an idealistic dream? Yes, very much so. But it is precisely conditions such as these that breed idealism and it is from the belly of idealism that all the great popular revolutions of the world have been born. This is the way it will have to be in Pakistan too if we want to survive and thrive. There is no future for this nation under the decay of the status quo and its proponents who are running the country like a Tehsildar runs a Tehsil.

The seeds of salvation cannot be found in the quicksand of a failed and painful present or past. We must break free from this quicksand. It is shocking that some people still take Musharraf seriously. It is only a reflection of the horrible mess this government has made that even he now appears more palatable than the current lot. But what hope of a better future could possibly emanate from a man who carried out a military coup first against an elected government and then against the judiciary, shredding what remained of democracy and the constitution, ruled with the aid of corrupt and disreputable political mercenaries, sold Pakistani citizens to foreign powers for a fistful of dollars and mortgaged national sovereignty before them in exchange for power? It does not suffice to set a country down the path to oblivion and then say “Oops, I am sorry!”.

Perhaps as a consequence of the repeated letdowns and betrayals we have suffered at the hands of supposed messiahs and saviours, we have reached the point of being terrified of anything new, novel and unfamiliar and prefer to seek solace in the already known. That is why, instead of moving ahead towards a bright new future, we look for answers in the past, which we dronishly cling to despite the harm it has caused. Is it any wonder that we keep going round in circles and find ourselves standing at the edge of the same precipice time and again?

Official Portrayal of War in Afghanistan

A six-year archive of classified military documents made public on Sunday offers an unvarnished, ground-level picture of the war in Afghanistan that is in many respects more grim than the official portrayal.

The secret documents, released on the Internet by an organization called WikiLeaks, are a daily diary of an American-led force often starved for resources and attention as it struggled against an insurgency that grew larger, better coordinated and more deadly each year.

The New York Times, the British newspaper The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel were given access to the voluminous records several weeks ago on the condition that they not report on the material before Sunday.

The documents – some 92,000 reports spanning parts of two administrations from January 2004 through December 2009 – illustrate in mosaic detail why, after the United States has spent almost $300 billion on the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban are stronger than at any time since 2001.

As the new American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus, tries to reverse the lagging war effort, the documents sketch a war hamstrung by an Afghan government, police force and army of questionable loyalty and competence, and by a Pakistani military that appears at best uncooperative and at worst to work from the shadows as an unspoken ally of the very insurgent forces the American-led coalition is trying to defeat.

The material comes to light as Congress and the public grow increasingly skeptical of the deepening involvement in Afghanistan and its chances for success as next year’s deadline to begin withdrawing troops looms.

The archive is a vivid reminder that the Afghan conflict until recently was a second-class war, with money, troops and attention lavished on Iraq while soldiers and Marines lamented that the Afghans they were training were not being paid.

The reports – usually spare summaries but sometimes detailed narratives – shed light on some elements of the war that have been largely hidden from the public eye:

• The Taliban have used portable heat-seeking missiles against allied aircraft, a fact that has not been publicly disclosed by the military. This type of weapon helped the Afghan mujahedeen defeat the Soviet occupation in the 1980s.

• Secret commando units like Task Force 373 – a classified group of Army and Navy special operatives – work from a “capture/kill list” of about 70 top insurgent commanders. These missions, which have been stepped up under the Obama administration, claim notable successes, but have sometimes gone wrong, killing civilians and stoking Afghan resentment.

• The military employs more and more drone aircraft to survey the battlefield and strike targets in Afghanistan, although their performance is less impressive than officially portrayed. Some crash or collide, forcing American troops to undertake risky retrieval missions before the Taliban can claim the drone’s weaponry.

• The Central Intelligence Agency has expanded paramilitary operations inside Afghanistan. The units launch ambushes, order airstrikes and conduct night raids. From 2001 to 2008, the C.I.A. paid the budget of Afghanistan’s spy agency and ran it as a virtual subsidiary.

Over all, the documents do not contradict official accounts of the war. But in some cases the documents show that the American military made misleading public statements – attributing the downing of a helicopter to conventional weapons instead of heat-seeking missiles or giving Afghans credit for missions carried out by Special Operations commandos.

White House officials vigorously denied that the Obama administration had presented a misleading portrait of the war in Afghanistan.

“On Dec. 1, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy with a substantial increase in resources for Afghanistan, and increased focus on Al Qaeda and Taliban safe-havens in Pakistan, precisely because of the grave situation that had developed over several years,” said Gen. James L. Jones, White House national security adviser, in a statement released Sunday.

“We know that serious challenges lie ahead, but if Afghanistan is permitted to slide backwards, we will again face a threat from violent extremist groups like Al Qaeda who will have more space to plot and train,” the statement said.

General Jones also decried the decision by WikiLeaks to make the documents public, saying that the United States “strongly condemns the disclosure of classified information by individuals and organizations which could put the lives of Americans and our partners at risk, and threaten our national security.”"

“WikiLeaks made no effort to contact us about these documents – the United States government learned from news organizations that these documents would be posted,” General Jones said.

The archive is clearly an incomplete record of the war. It is missing many references to seminal events and does not include more highly classified information. The documents also do not cover events in 2010, when the influx of more troops into Afghanistan began and a new counterinsurgency strategy took hold.

They suggest that the military’s internal assessments of the prospects for winning over the Afghan public, especially in the early days, were often optimistic, even naïve.

There are fleeting – even taunting – reminders of how the war began in the occasional references to the elusive Osama bin Laden. In some reports he is said to be attending meetings in Quetta, Pakistan. His money man is said to be flying from Iran to North Korea to buy weapons. Mr. bin Laden has supposedly ordered a suicide attack against the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. These reports all seem secondhand at best.

The reports portray a resilient, canny insurgency that has bled American forces through a war of small cuts. The insurgents set the war’s pace, usually fighting on ground of their own choosing and then slipping away.

Sabotage and trickery have been weapons every bit as potent as small arms, mortars or suicide bombers. So has Taliban intimidation of Afghan officials and civilians – applied with pinpoint pressure through threats, charm, violence, money, religious fervor and populist appeals.

FEB. 19, 2008 | ZABUL PROVINCE
Intelligence Summary: Officer Threatened

An Afghan National Army brigade commander working in southern Afghanistan received a phone call from a Taliban mullah named Ezat, one brief report said. “Mullah Ezat told the ANA CDR to surrender and offered him $100,000(US) to quit working for the Afghan Army,” the report said. “Ezat also stated that he knows where the ANA CDR is from and knows his family.”

MAY 9, 2009 | KUNAR PROVINCE
Intelligence Summary: Taliban Recruiter

A Taliban commander, Mullah Juma Khan, delivered a eulogy at the funeral of a slain insurgent. He played on the crowd’s emotions, according to the report: “Juma cried while telling the people an unnamed woman and her baby were killed while the woman was nursing the baby.” Finally he made his pitch: “Juma then told the people they needed to be angry at CF [Coalition Force] and ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] for causing this tragedy” and “invited everyone who wants to fight to join the fighters who traveled with him.”

The insurgents use a network of spies, double agents, collaborators and informers – anything to undercut coalition forces and the effort to build a credible and effective Afghan government capable of delivering security and services.

The reports repeatedly describe instances when the insurgents have been seen wearing government uniforms, and other times when they have roamed the country or appeared for battle in the very Ford Ranger pickup trucks that the United States had provided the Afghan Army and police force.

NOV. 20, 2006 | KABUL
Incident Report:Insurgent Subterfuge

After capturing four pickup trucks from the Afghan National Army, the Taliban took them to Kabul to be used in suicide bombings. “They intend to use the pick-up trucks to target ANA compounds, ISAF and GOA convoys, as well as ranking GOA and ISAF officials,” said a report, referring to coalition forces and the government of Afghanistan. “The four trucks were also accompanied by an unknown quantity of ANA uniforms to facilitate carrying out the attacks.”

The Taliban’s use of heat-seeking missiles has not been publicly disclosed – indeed, the military has issued statements that these internal records contradict.

In the form known as a Stinger, such weapons were provided to a previous generation of Afghan insurgents by the United States, and helped drive out the Soviets. The reports suggest that the Taliban’s use of these missiles has been neither common nor especially effective; usually the missiles missed.

MAY 30, 2007 | HELMAND PROVINCE
Incident Report: Downed Helicopter

An American CH-47 transport helicopter was struck by what witnesses described as a portable heat-seeking surface-to-air missile after taking off from a landing zone.

The helicopter, the initial report said, “was engaged and struck with a Missile … shortly after crossing over the Helmand River. The missile struck the aircraft in the left engine. The impact of the missile projected the aft end of the aircraft up as it burst into flames followed immediately by a nose dive into the crash site with no survivors.”

The crash killed seven soldiers: five Americans, a Briton and a Canadian.

Multiple witnesses saw a smoke trail behind the missile as it rushed toward the helicopter. The smoke trail was an important indicator. Rocket-propelled grenades do not leave them. Heat-seeking missiles do. The crew of other helicopters reported the downing as a surface-to-air missile strike. But that was not what a NATO spokesman told Reuters.

“Clearly, there were enemy fighters in the area,” said the spokesman, Maj. John Thomas. “It’s not impossible for small-arms fire to bring down a helicopter.”

The reports paint a disheartening picture of the Afghan police and soldiers at the center of the American exit strategy.

The Pentagon is spending billions to train the Afghan forces to secure the country. But the police have proved to be an especially risky investment and are often described as distrusted, even loathed, by Afghan civilians. The reports recount episodes of police brutality, corruption petty and large, extortion and kidnapping. Some police officers defect to the Taliban. Others are accused of collaborating with insurgents, arms smugglers and highway bandits. Afghan police officers defect with trucks or weapons, items captured during successful ambushes or raids.

MARCH 10, 2008 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Investigation Report: Extortion by the Police

This report captured the circular and frustrating effort by an American investigator to stop Afghan police officers at a checkpoint from extorting payments from motorists. After a line of drivers described how they were pressed to pay bribes, the American investigator and the local police detained the accused checkpoint police officers.

“While waiting,” the investigator wrote, “I asked the seven patrolmen we detained to sit and relax while we sorted through a problem without ever mentioning why they were being detained. Three of the patrolmen responded by saying that they had only taken money from the truck drivers to buy fuel for their generator.”

Two days later when the American followed up, he was told by police officers that the case had been dropped because the witness reports had all been lost.

One report documented the detention of a military base worker trying to leave the base with GPS units hidden under his clothes and taped to his leg. Another described the case of a police chief in Zurmat, in Paktia Province, who was accused of falsely reporting that his officers had been in a firefight so he could receive thousands of rounds of new ammunition, which he sold in a bazaar.

Coalition trainers report that episodes of cruelty by the Afghan police undermine the effort to build a credible security force to take over when the allies leave.

OCT. 11, 2009 | BALKH PROVINCE
Incident Report: Brutal Police Chief

This report began with an account of Afghan soldiers and police officers harassing and beating local civilians for refusing to cooperate in a search. It then related the story of a district police commander who forced himself on a 16-year-old girl. When a civilian complained, the report continued, “The district commander ordered his bodyguard to open fire on the AC [Afghan civilian]. The bodyguard refused, at which time the district commander shot [the bodyguard] in front of the AC.”

Rivalries and friction between the largest Afghan security services – the police and the army – are evident in a number of reports. Sometimes the tensions erupted in outright clashes, as was recorded in the following report from last December that was described as an “enemy action.” The “enemy” in this case was the Afghan National Security Force.

DEC. 4, 2009 | ORUZGAN PROVINCE
Incident Report: Police and Army Rivalry

A car accident turned deadly when an argument broke out between the police and the Afghan National Army. “The argument escalated and ANA & ANP started to shoot at each other,” a report said.

An Afghan soldier and three Afghan police officers were wounded in the shootout. One civilian was killed and six others were wounded by gunfire.

One sign of the weakness of the police is that in places they have been replaced by tribal warlords who are charged – informally but surely – with providing the security the government cannot. Often the warlords operate above the law.

NOV. 22, 2009 | KANDAHAR PROVINCE
Incident Report: Illegal Checkpoint

A private security convoy, ferrying fuel from Kandahar to Oruzgan, was stopped by what was thought to be 100 insurgents armed with assault rifles and PK machine guns, a report said.

It turned out the convoy had been halted by “the local Chief of Police,” who was “demanding $2000-$3000 per truck” as a kind of toll. The chief, said the report, from NATO headquarters in Southern Afghanistan, “states he needs the money to run his operation.”

The chief was not actually a police chief. He was Matiullah Khan, a warlord and an American-backed ally of President Karzai who was arguably Oruzgan’s most powerful man. He had a contract, the Ministry of Interior said, to protect the road so NATO’s supply convoys could drive on it, but he had apparently decided to extort money from the convoys himself.

Late in the day, Mr. Matiullah, after many interventions, changed his mind. The report said that friendly forces “report that the COMPASS convoy is moving again and did not pay the fee required.”

The documents show how the best intentions of Americans to help rebuild Afghanistan through provincial reconstruction teams ran up against a bewildering array of problems – from corruption to cultural misunderstandings – as they tried to win over the public by helping repair dams and bridges, build schools and train local authorities.

A series of reports from 2005 to 2008 chart the frustrations of one of the first such teams, assigned to Gardez, in Paktia Province.

NOV. 28, 2006 | PAKTIA PROVINCE Civil
Affairs Report: Orphanage Opens

An American civil affairs officer could barely contain her enthusiasm as she spoke at a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new orphanage, built with money from the American military.

The officer said a friend had given her a leather jacket to present to “someone special,” the report noted. She chose the orphanage’s director. “The commander stated that she could think of no one more deserving then someone who cared for orphans,” it said.

The civil affairs team handed out blankets, coats, scarves and toys. The governor even gave money from his own pocket. “All speeches were very positive,” the report concluded.

DEC. 20, 2006 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Civil Affairs Report: Not Many Orphans

The team dropped by to check on the orphanage. “We found very few orphans living there and could not find most of the HA [humanitarian assistance] we had given them,” the report noted.

The team raised the issue with the governor of Paktia, who said he was also concerned and suspected that the money he had donated had not reached the children. He visited the orphanage himself. Only 30 children were there; the director had claimed to have 102.

OCT. 16, 2007 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Civil Affairs Report: An Empty Orphanage

Nearly a year after the opening of the orphanage, the Americans returned for a visit. “There are currently no orphans at the facility due to the Holiday. (Note: orphans are defined as having no father, but may still have mother and a family structure that will have them home for holidays.)”

FEB. 25, 2007 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
District Report: Lack of Resources

As the Taliban insurgency strengthened, the lack of a government presence in the more remote districts – and the government’s inability to provide security or resources even to its own officials – is evident in the reports.

An official from Dand Wa Patan, a small sliver of a district along the border with Pakistan, so urgently wanted to talk to the members of the American team that he traveled three and a half hours by taxi – he had no car – to meet them.

“He explained that the enemy had changed their tactics in the area and were no longer fighting from the mountains, no longer sending rockets toward his compound and other areas,” the report noted. “He stated that the enemy focus was on direct action and that his family was a primary target.”

Ten days earlier the Taliban crept up to the wall of his family compound and blew up one of the security towers, the report said. His son lost his legs in the explosion.

He pleaded for more police officers, weapons and ammunition. He also wanted a car so he could drive around the district he was supposed to oversee.

But the Americans’ situation was not much better. For months the reports show how a third – or even a half – of the team’s vehicles were out of service, awaiting spare parts.

NOV. 15, 2006 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Civil Affairs Report: Local Corruption

For a while the civil affairs team worked closely with the provincial governor, described as “very charismatic.” Yet both he and the team are hampered by corrupt, negligent and antagonistic officials.

The provincial chief of police is described in one report as “the axel of corruption.”

“He makes every effort to openly and blatantly take money from the ANP troopers and the officers,” one sympathetic officer told the Americans.

Other officers are more clever. One forged rosters, to collect pay for imaginary police officers. A second set up illegal checkpoints to collects tolls around Gardez. Still another stole food and uniforms, leaving his soldiers underfed and ill equipped for the winter.

The governor, meanwhile, was all but trapped. Such animosity developed between him and a senior security official that the governor could not leave his office for weeks at a time, fearing for his life. Finally, the corrupt officials were replaced. But it took months.

SEPT. 24, 2007 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Civil Affairs Report: The Cost of Corruption

Their meetings with Afghan district officials gave the American civil affairs officers unique insights into local opinions. Sometimes, the Afghan officials were brutally honest in their assessments.

In one case, provincial council officials visited the Americans at their base in Gardez to report threats – the Taliban had tossed a grenade into their office compound and were prowling the hills. Then the officials began a tirade.

“The people of Afghanistan keep loosing their trust in the government because of the high amount of corrupted government officials,” the report quoted them as saying. “The general view of the Afghans is that the current government is worst than the Taliban.”

“The corrupted government officials are a new concept brought to Afghanistan by the AMERICANS,” the oldest member of the group told the civil affairs team.

In conclusion, the civil affairs officer who wrote the report warned, “The people will support the Anti-Coalition forces and the security condition will degenerate.” He recommended a public information program to educate Afghans about democracy.

The reports also evoke the rivalries and tensions that swirl within the presidential palace between President Karzai’s circle and the warlords.

OCT. 16, 2006 | KABUL
Intelligence Summary: Political Intrigue

In a short but heated meeting at the presidential palace, the Kabul police chief, Brig. Gen. Mir Amanullah Gozar, angrily refuted accusations made publicly by Jamil Karzai that he was corrupt and lacked professional experience. The report of the meeting identified Jamil Karzai as the president’s brother; he is in fact a cousin.

General Gozar “said that if Jamil were not the president’s Brother he would kidnap, torture, and kill him,” the report said. He added that he was aware of plans by the American-led coalition to remove him from his post.

He threatened the president, saying that if he were replaced he would reveal “allegations about Karzai having been a drug trader and supporter of the Pakistan-led insurgency in Afghanistan,” presumably a reference to Mr. Karzai’s former links with the Taliban.

Incident by incident, the reports resemble a police blotter of the myriad ways Afghan civilians were killed – not just in airstrikes but in ones and twos – in shootings on the roads or in the villages, in misunderstandings or in a cross-fire, or in chaotic moments when Afghan drivers ventured too close to convoys and checkpoints.

The dead, the reports repeatedly indicate, were not suicide bombers or insurgents, and many of the cases were not reported to the public at the time. The toll of the war – reflected in mounting civilian casualties – left the Americans seeking cooperation and support from an Afghan population that grew steadily more exhausted, resentful, fearful and alienated.

From the war’s outset, airstrikes that killed civilians in large numbers seized international attention, including the aerial bombardment of a convoy on its way to attend President Karzai’s inauguration in 2001. An airstrike in Azizabad, in western Afghanistan, killed as many as 92 people in August 2008. In May 2009, another strike killed 147 Afghan civilians.

SEPT. 3, 2009 | KUNDUZ PROVINCE
Incident Report: Mistaken Airstrike

This report, filed about the activities of a Joint Terminal Attack Controller team, which is responsible for communication from the ground and guiding pilots during surveillance missions and airstrikes, offers a glimpse into one of the bloodiest mistakes in 2009.

It began with a report from the police command saying that “2X FUEL TRUCKS WERE STOLEN BY UNK NUMBER OF INS” and that the insurgents planned to cross the Kunduz River with their prizes. It was nighttime, and the river crossing was not illuminated. Soon, the report noted, the “JTAC OBSERVED KDZ RIVER AND REPORTED THAT IT DISCOVERED THE TRUCKS AS WELL AS UP TO 70 INS” at “THE FORD ON THE RIVER. THE TRUCKS WERE STUCK IN THE MUD.” How the JTAC team was observing the trucks was not clear, but many aircraft have infrared video cameras that can send a live feed to a computer monitor on the ground.

According to the report, a German commander of the provincial reconstruction team “LINKED UP WITH JTAC AND, AFTER ENSURING THAT NO CIVILIANS WERE IN THE VICINITY,” he “AUTHORIZED AN AIRSTRIKE.” An F-15 then dropped two 500-pound guided bombs. The initial report said that “56X INS KIA [insurgents killed in action] (CONFIRMED) AND 14X INS FLEEING IN NE DIRECTION. THE 2X FUEL TRUCKS WERE ALSO DESTROYED.”

The initial report was wrong. The trucks had been abandoned, and a crowd of civilians milled around them, removing fuel. How the commander and the JTAC had ensured “that no civilians were in the area,” as the report said, was not explained.

The first sign of the mistake documented in the initial report appeared the next day, when another report said that at “0900 hrs International Media reported that US airstrike had killed 60 civilians in Kunduz. The media are reporting that Taliban did steal the trucks and had invited civilians in the area to take fuel.”

The reports show that the smaller incidents were just as insidious and alienating, turning Afghans who had once welcomed Americans as liberators against the war.

MARCH 5, 2007 | GHAZNI PROVINCE
Incident Report: Checkpoint Danger

Afghan police officers shot a local driver who tried to speed through their checkpoint on a country road in Ghazni Province south of Kabul. The police had set up a temporary checkpoint on the highway just outside the main town in the district of Ab Band.

“A car approached the check point at a high rate of speed,” the report said. All the police officers fled the checkpoint except one. As the car passed the checkpoint it knocked down the lone policeman. He fired at the vehicle, apparently thinking that it was a suicide car bomber.

“The driver of the vehicle was killed,” the report said. “No IED [improvised explosive device] was found and vehicle was destroyed.”

The police officer was detained in the provincial capital, Ghazni, and questioned. He was then released. The American mentoring the police concluded in his assessment that the policeman’s use of force was appropriate. Rather than acknowledging the public hostility such episodes often engender, the report found a benefit: it suggested that the shooting would make Afghans take greater care at checkpoints in the future.

“Effects on the populace clearly identify the importance of stopping at checkpoints,” the report concluded.

MARCH 21, 2007 | PAKTIKA PROVINCE
Incident Report: A Deaf Man Is Shot

Members of a C.I.A. paramilitary unit moved into the village of Malekshay in Paktika Province close to the border with Pakistan when they saw an Afghan running away at the sight of their convoy, one report recounted. Members of the unit shot him in the ankle, and medics treated him at the scene. The unit had followed military procedure – first shouting at the man, then firing warning shots and only after that shooting to wound, the report said.

Yet elders in the village told the unit that the man, Shum Khan, was deaf and mute and that he had fled from the convoy out of nervousness. Mr. Khan was “unable to hear the warnings or warning shots. Ran out of fear and confusion,” the report concludes. The unit handed over supplies in compensation.

The reports reveal several instances of allied forces accidentally firing on one another or on Afghan forces in the fog of war, often with tragic consequences.

APRIL 6, 2006 | HELMAND PROVINCE
Incident Report: Friendly Fire

A British Army convoy driving at night in southern Afghanistan suddenly came under small-arms fire. One of the British trucks rolled over. The British troops split into two groups, pulled back from the clash and called in airstrikes from American A-10 attack planes. After several confusing minutes, commanders realized that the Afghan police had attacked the British troops, mistaking them for Taliban fighters. One Afghan police officer was killed and 12 others were wounded.

The shifting tactics of the Americans can be seen as well in the reports, as the war strategy veered from freely using force to trying to minimize civilian casualties. But as the documents make clear, each approach has its frustrations for the American effort.

Strict new rules of engagement, imposed in 2009, minimized the use of airstrikes after some had killed civilians and turned Afghans against the war. But the rules also prompted anger from American troops and their families. The troops felt that their lives were not sufficiently valued because they had to justify every request for air or artillery support, making it easier for the Taliban to fight.

OCT. 1, 2008 | KUNAR PROVINCE
Incident Report: Barrage

In the days when field commanders had a freer hand, an infantry company commander observed an Afghan with a two-way radio who was monitoring the company’s activities. Warning of “IMMINENT THREAT,” the commander said he would “destroy” the man and his equipment – in other words, kill him. A short while later, a 155-millimeter artillery piece at a forward operating base in the nearby Pech Valley began firing high-explosive rounds – 24 in all.

NOV. 13, 2009 | HELMAND PROVINCE
Incident Report: Escalation of Force

As the rules tightened, the reports picked up a tone that at times seemed lawyerly. Many make reference, even in pitched fights, to troops using weapons in accordance with “ROE Card A” – which guides actions of self-defense rather than attacks or offensive acts. This report described an Apache helicopter firing warning shots after coming under fire. Its reaction was described as “an escalation of force.”

The helicopter pilots reported that insurgents “engaged with SAF [surface-to-air fire]“and that “INTEL suggested they were going to be fired upon again during their extraction.”

The helicopters “fired 40x 30mm warning shots to deter any further engagement.”

The report included the information that now is common to incident reports in which Western forces fire. “The terrain was considered rurally open and there were no CIV PID IVO [civilians positively identified in the vicinity of ] the target within reasonable certainty. There was no damage to infrastructure. BDA [battle damage assessment] recording conducted by AH-64 Gun Tape. No follow up required. The next higher command was consulted. The enemy engaged presented, in the opinion of the ground forces, an imminent threat. Engagement is under ROE Card A. Higher HQ have been informed.”

The reports show in previously unknown detail the omnipresence of drones in Afghanistan, the Air Force’s missile-toting Predators and Reapers that hunt militants. The military’s use of drones in Afghanistan has rapidly expanded in the past few years; the United States Air Force now flies about 20 Predator and Reaper aircraft a day – nearly twice as many as a year ago – over vast stretches of hostile Afghan territory. Allies like Britain and Germany fly their own fleets.

The incident reports chronicle the wide variety of missions these aircraft carry out: taking photographs, scooping up electronic transmissions, relaying images of running battles to field headquarters, attacking militants with bombs and missiles. And they also reveal the extent that armed drones are being used to support American Special Operations missions.

Documents in the Afghan archive capture the strange nature of the drone war in Afghanistan: missile-firing robots killing shovel-wielding insurgents, a remote-controlled war against a low-tech but resilient insurgency.

DEC. 9, 2008 | KANDAHAR PROVINCE
Incident Report: Predator Attack

Early one winter evening in southern Afghanistan, an Air Force Predator drone spotted a group of insurgents suspected of planting roadside bombs along a roadway less than two miles from Forward Operating Base Hutal, an American outpost.

Unlike the drones the C.I.A. operated covertly across the border in Pakistan, this aircraft was one of nearly a dozen military drones patrolling vast stretches of hostile Afghan territory on any given day.

Within minutes after identifying the militants, the Predator unleashed a Hellfire missile, all but evaporating one of the figures digging in the dark.

When ground troops reached the crater caused by the missile, costing $60,000, all that was left was a shovel and a crowbar.

SEPT. 13, 2009 | BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE
Incident Report: A Lost Drone

Flying over southern Afghanistan on a combat mission, one of the Air Force’s premier armed drones, a Reaper, went rogue.

Equipped with advanced radar and sophisticated cameras, as well as Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, the Reaper had lost its satellite link to a pilot who was remotely steering the drone from a base in the United States.

Again and again, the pilot struggled to regain control of the drone. Again and again, no response. The reports reveal that the military in Afghanistan lost many of the tiny five-pound surveillance drones with names like Raven and Desert Hawk that troops tossed out like model airplanes to peer around the next hill. But they had never before lost one of the Reapers, with its 66-foot wingspan.

As a last resort, commanders ordered an Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet to shoot down the $13 million aircraft before it soared unguided into neighboring Tajikistan.

Ground controllers picked an unpopulated area over northern Afghanistan and the jet fired a Sidewinder missile, destroying the Reaper’s turbo-prop engine. Suddenly, the satellite link was restored, but it was too late to salvage the flight. At 5:30 a.m., controllers steered it into a remote mountainside for a final fiery landing.

As the Afghanistan war took priority under the Obama administration, more Special Operations forces were shifted from Iraq to conduct secret missions. The C.I.A.’s own paramilitary operations inside Afghanistan grew in tandem – as did the agency’s close collaboration with Afghanistan’s own spy agency.

Usually, such teams conducted night operations aimed at top Taliban commanders and militants on the “capture/kill” list. While individual commandos have displayed great courage, the missions can end in calamity as well as success. The expanding special operations have stoked particular resentment among Afghans – for their lack of coordination with local forces, the civilian casualties they frequently inflicted and the lack of accountability.

JUNE 17, 2007 | PAKTIKA PROVINCE
INCIDENT REPORT: Botched Night Raid

Shortly after five American rockets destroyed a compound in Paktika Province, helicopter-borne commandos from Task Force 373 – a classified Special Operations unit of Army Delta Force operatives and members of the Navy Seals – arrived to finish the job.

The mission was to capture or kill Abu Laith al-Libi, a top commander for Al Qaeda, who was believed to be hiding at the scene of the strike.

But Mr. Libi was not there. Instead, the Special Operations troops found a group of men suspected of being militants and their children. Seven of the children had been killed by the rocket attack.

Some of the men tried to flee the Americans, and six were quickly killed by encircling helicopters. After the rest were taken as detainees, the commandos found one child still alive in the rubble, and performed CPR for 20 minutes.

Word of the attack spread a wave of anger across the region, forcing the local governor to meet with village elders to defuse the situation.

American military officials drew up a list of “talking points” for the governor, pointing out that the target had been a senior Qaeda commander, that there had been no indications that women and children would be present and that a nearby mosque had not been damaged.

After the meeting, the governor reported that local residents were in shock, but that he had “pressed the Talking Points.” He even “added a few of his own that followed in line with our current story.”

The attack was caused by the “presence of hoodlums,” the governor told the people. It was a tragedy that children had been killed, he said, but “it could have been prevented had the people exposed the presence of insurgents in the area.”

He promised that the families would be compensated for their loss.

Mr. Libi was killed the following year by a C.I.A. drone strike.

APRIL 6, 2008 | NURISTAN PROVINCE
Incident Report: A Raging Firefight

As they scrambled up the rocks toward a cluster of mud compounds perched high over the remote Shok Valley, a small group of American Green Berets and Afghan troops, known as Task Force Bushmaster, were confronted with a hail of gunfire from inside the insurgent stronghold.

They were there to capture senior members of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin militant group, part of a mission that the military had dubbed Operation Commando Wrath.

But what they soon discovered on that remote, snowy hilltop was that they were vastly outnumbered by a militant force of hundreds of fighters. Reinforcements were hours away.

A firefight raged for nearly seven hours, with sniper fire pinning down the Green Berets on a 60-foot rock ledge for much of that time.

Casualties mounted. By midmorning, nearly half of the Americans were wounded, but the militants directed their gunfire on the arriving medevac helicopters, preventing them from landing.

“TF Bushmaster reports they are combat ineffective and request reinforcement at this time.”

For a time, radio contact was lost.

Air Force jets arrived at the scene and began pummeling the compounds with 2,000-pound bombs, but the militants continued to advance down the mountain toward the pinned-down group.

The task force reported that there were ” 50-100 insurgents moving to reinforce against Bushmaster elements from the SW.”

Carrying wounded Americans shot in the pelvis, arm and legs – as well as two dead Afghans – the group made its way down toward the valley floor. Eventually, the helicopters were able to arrive to evacuate the dead and wounded.

Ten members of the Green Berets would receive Silver Stars for their actions during the battle, the highest number given to Special Forces soldiers for a single battle since the Vietnam War. By Army estimates, 150 to 200 militants were killed in the battle.

MARCH 8, 2008 | BAGRAM AIR BASE
Meeting Report: A Plea for Help

Toward the end of a long meeting with top American military commanders, during which he delivered a briefing about the security situation in eastern Afghanistan, corruption in the government and Pakistan’s fecklessness in hunting down militants, Afghanistan’s top spy laid out his problem.

Amrullah Saleh, then director of the National Directorate of Security, told the Americans that the C.I.A. would no longer be handling his spy service’s budget. For years, the C.I.A. had essentially run the N.D.S. as a subsidiary, but by 2009 the Afghan government was preparing to take charge of the agency’s budget.

Mr. Saleh estimated that with the C.I.A. no longer bankrolling the Afghan spies, he could be facing a budget cut of 30 percent.

So he made a request. With the budget squeeze coming, Mr. Saleh asked the Americans for any AK-47s and ammunition they could spare.