A DEADLY NARRATIVE

By: Ismail Khan

As high level US visitors come to Pakistan the impression is that efforts are being made to revamp end reorient the US-Pakistan relationship after the Raymond Davis and OBL incidents. This may or may not be so but much more is happening on the street and a narrative is taking shape that is getting more and more takers. It would be folly to ignore this reality.

If confused and convoluted official statements are ignored then what eye witnesses and some from the forces that battled the attackers in Karachi’s Mehran Base have said is eye-opening. It is being reported that there were up to 11 Chinese on the base. No one has explained why they were there when the base was home to US supplied P3c Orion Aircraft – especially when US sensitivity to transfer of their technology to China is well known and clearly communicated to Pakistan. It is clear from events as they unfolded that the primary objective of the attack were the US supplied aircraft and not the Americans on the base for maintenance and training. There is plausible evidence that the attackers attempted to take the Chinese hostage but the Americans were not targeted. It is said that some of the attackers had tattooed arms-a typically American habit but frowned upon in this part of the world. One such tattooed person who looks to be an American was shot dead in a bush and had communication equipment with him indicating that he was controlling the operation. Reports on the number of attackers vary from

12 to 25 and most believe the higher figure. The talk of help to the attackers from inside the base is now leaning towards the notion that this help came from the Americans on the base and not, as people are being tutored to believe, from penetration of the Navy by militants. The journalist Salim Shahzad was probably killed because he was peddling the story about ‘Al Qaeda within the Pakistani ranks’ – something of which there is no evidence. There is, however ample evidence of covert American presence in Pakistan after they used their moles to gain access through liberally supplied visas. If Raymond Davis was not enough then the stand-off in Peshawer just a day ago is a more recent event-diplomats when checked identify themselves, they don’t sit and sulk behind locked doors and black tinted glasses in their host country defying the laws of the land.

There is more on the street. A Tehrik Taleban (TTP) spokesman speaking from Mohmand (a supposedly subdued tribal agency of FATA) has said that even if the Americans/NATO leave Afghanistan their fight against Pakistan would go on because they are fighting to bring ‘Islamic rule’ in Pakistan and that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are not in danger because these are Islamic assets to be used in the service of Islam. These pronouncements come when the US is being asked to pull out after the OBL killing and after pulling out rely on small forces carrying out focused operations. Pakistan has been pushing for a shift to political resolution in Afghanistan balking at the pressure to get into North Waziristan in tandem with US led military operations in Afghanistan and stepped up Drone strikes. The reports of US drones targeting the anti-Pakistan TTP and the new revelations of TTP’s global agenda as well as long term designs on Pakistan are all coincidentally timed to ramp up the pressure on Pakistan even as the Hedley courtroom drama makes headway in incriminating the ISI – already reeling from the US delivered below the belt blow in Abbottabad. The earlier reports of Raymond Davis’ contacts with TTP now start making sense because the best option would be to stay covert and get the TTP to do the dirty work in Pakistan with careful pay-offs using Indian RAW and Afghan NDS assets as well as old Pakistan hating loyalists like the ex NDS chief now operating from the background. Cleverly orchestrated this could keep the TTP in the dark about who they were actually working for. Add to all this the fact that post OBL and post Mehran the military and the ISI are in the dock and severely downgraded domestically – something that surely gladdens the hearts of the US, the Indians and the Afghan government.

What does all this add up to? It gives the Pakistani street a narrative that fits neatly into anti-American sentiment. To many the logic is simple – use covert operations to launch the overt OBL raid. Use covert operations and local assets to launch a ‘terrorist’ attack that sends the message about not transferring US technology. Use covert contacts to create the pressure that will get Pakistan into North Waziristan to help create the environment for the Obama promised withdrawal in July. If this narrative is flawed then it is time for the US to start telling the Pakistanis what they are up to and to end the charade of de-hyphenation when it is actually a trilateral hyphenation against Pakistan – the CIA, RAW and NDS behind the smoke screen that is the TTP. A civil-military confrontation, public opinion and media running down the military and ISI, lawlessness and internal breakdown are bonus dividends not to be scoffed at.

COHEN ON PAKISTAN

By Ghalib Sultan
ZoneAsia-Pk

Dr Stephen Cohen’s interview with the Council on Foreign Relations has been published in Pakistan Today dated January 10, 2011. Dr Cohen is a respected scholar but he has strong views-especially on Pakistan though he is very critical of the Obama administrations’ policies too. Like many others he has a soft corner for India and, understandably for Israel that tends to color his perception of Pakistan.

Dr Cohen reads too much into the events unfolding in Pakistan after Governor Taseer’s assassination and while one can agree with him on the seriousness of Pakistan’s problems it would be folly to read too much into the power of the ‘extremists’ and ‘militants’ or the far right in Pakistan’s politics. There is no doubt that there has been degradation in Pakistan’s internal and external security environment but to say that ‘Pakistan is moving towards comprehensive failure’ is unfair, far too judgmental and only someone not quite friendly with Pakistan could say that. Suggesting that ‘we should prepare for Pakistan’s failure’ over five to six years is an opinion that is not based on any real data. It is surprising that Dr Cohen formed this opinion after a recent visit to Pakistan-perhaps he met the wrong people or only met his ‘friends’ or he ignored the views of some whom he met. Pakistan remains a functional state with its institutions intact.

Contrary to what Cohen says Pakistan’s importance is not just because of its ‘nukes and terrorist networks’ but because Pakistan is inching towards sustainable democracy, because it wants to be a moderate Muslim state, because it has put in place excellent custodial controls and because it actually wants to rid itself of all terrorists from its soil. The average Pakistani, and that means the majority, wants peace, security and an environment in which he can work and look after his family-not much different from what the average American wants and this applies to all areas of Pakistan including FATA. That is why the militants and extremists have never figured in elections. Election year is 2012 and political parties are preparing—this should explain the shenanigans of the religious right. They need an issue and think that they have found one.

Dr Cohen says that the military ‘cannot govern’. This is true. It does not want to govern. It does not even want to try. Dr Cohen should have got this message during his travels in Pakistan. No one wants military intervention and everyone wants a continuation of the present political system-warts and all. Pakistan’s current foreign policy obsession is not with Israel, Palestine or China-it is with a threat reduction strategy that allows it to shift focus to the economy and society. This is where the US can help Pakistan and if it does this sincerely then anti US sentiment will start changing. Dr Cohen says the military will never side with the ‘liberals’-the military will not side with the militants either and it is fully on board with the government on the road to democracy, economic uplift and threat reduction. The military is however not going to roll over and play dead anytime soon–nor is Pakistan. The relationship with China is strong and stable and multi-faceted. The Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship has to become stable-it is in the interest of both. The same applies to the relationship with India and Iran. Pakistan and indeed the region is looking at economic interaction, energy flows and infrastructure development-not at the doomsday scenario that Steve Cohen is predicting.

Pressure Tactics

By Ghalib Sultan

The recent New York Times article (NYT, Monday 20th November) that focuses on possible US military operations across the Pakistan-Afghan border into Pakistan to pursue Taliban and destroy sanctuaries may not be accurate but it is not that far off the mark as is being suggested. It has to be seen in the overall context of the pressure being orchestrated to get Pakistan to eliminate ‘Taliban sanctuaries’ in the FATA and Baluchistan. These ‘sanctuaries’ are being seen as the main reason for continued Taliban resistance, even resurgence, in Afghanistan by the US and their hosts-the Afghan government. The US wants Pakistan to ‘sanitize’ these sanctuaries.

The pressure on Pakistan to ‘act’ was always there. It has picked up dramatic momentum after the US Afghan War Strategy Review. Several tracks are being used to create a cumulative effect. There is the impression being created that the political government wants to fast track the normalization process with India and respond positively to US demands for action in the western border areas but the ‘establishment’ (euphemism for the military and intelligence-ISI) are the stumbling blocks. Needless to say both India and the Afghan government support this view. The ‘establishment’ is being projected as the real force calling the shots in the country and having its own agenda linked to its resource requirements. The past is dredged up to focus on old transgressions like interventions and policies that led to negative consequences and a blowback that has destabilized the country. Doubts are periodically raised about the security of strategic assets and a past proliferation episode is repeatedly presented with ‘new’ and ‘just uncovered’ dimensions to involve the military institution. There has been a most significant surge in drone strikes and this has led to outrage in civil society. Linked to this is the media report of possible US cross-border operations against ‘sanctuaries’. Within the domestic context the overall effect is that anti-US sentiment increases, the military gets blamed for passivity and for giving unprecedented access to the US (WIKILEAKS confirmed this!). Inevitably decision making becomes difficult because no military waging a counter-insurgency campaign can afford to be alienated from civil society. The government and the military also cannot act in tandem if there is the perception of a civil military divide-especially if this perception is created and nurtured.

Where this orchestrated campaign takes us cannot be predicted but it is clear that it will not lead to a situation that Pakistan desires. Pakistan (including the ‘establishment) wants a government-military-civil society relationship that is seen to be pulling in the same strategic direction and jointly resisting the attempts to cause discord or create the perception of discord. Pakistan understands its internal environment better than anybody else and knows that economic viability, security and internal harmony are interlinked and sensing the change in the regional balance of power knows that there cannot be a push for anything other than a threat reduction policy – this has implications for Pakistan’s policies towards India and Afghanistan. Pakistan – neither the government nor the establishment – can allow themselves to be railroaded into actions that lead to imbalance and violence across the country in a period of economic vulnerability. There is full understanding in Pakistan that sections of the western border areas are havens for drugs and weapon smugglers, bomb makers, suicide bomber trainers, criminals, kidnappers, insurgents and terrorists and would-be terrorists from across the world as well as Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda and various other organizations that are active in the region. Afghanistan and Pakistan are the two countries directly affected but legitimate concerns exist in the Central Asian States, Russia, China, India, Iran and countries that have disenchanted segments of society. Why would Pakistan want ‘sanctuaries’ that threaten it on its soil if it can act to destroy them?

So ‘sanctuaries’ are neither a US discovery nor an exclusive concern of the US. It follows that Pakistan would want its writ across its western border areas and stability within the country. The question is what effect is the US presence in Afghanistan having, how long this presence going to continue and how is it going to end – if ever? Clarity on this could do much to shape regional policies. The US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue should either lead to an understanding of respective positions or it should be treated as a façade behind which transactional and expedient policies are being implemented by those who lack the vision to see beyond the tactical domain – the orchestrated pressures and manipulated perceptions then start making sense. The drugs-weapons-dollars chain needs to be seriously challenged. Border security needs to be enhanced by a multi state effort. The ambiguity surrounding drone strikes and their targets is no longer sustainable and an agreed policy has to be evolved. Intelligence coordination on a regional basis is badly needed to track the dispersal of terrorists and exposure of their sponsors. Economic aid and support measures have to be raised to levels that compensate the countries involved for what they are losing. An overall environment has to be created for a negotiated political settlement that is acceptable to all and that survives the US/NATO withdrawal.

US was not onboard on Nov 3 emergency

By: Tariq Butt

ISLAMABAD: The United States had expressed “dissatisfaction” over the imposition of emergency and promulgation of the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) by Pervez Musharraf on November 3, 2007, according to a US Embassy Kabul dispatch, released by WikiLeaks.

Just three days after the sweeping steps taken by Musharraf, Secretary of Defence for Policy Eric Edelman noted in a meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai that US-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group (DCG) talks were postponed to underscore US dissatisfaction with the imposition of the PCO; it was also not clear that our Pakistani interlocutors would be able to focus on the DCG agenda, given the current political turmoil.

The cable said that Musharraf recognises that if/when (Benazir) Bhutto takes power, he will be out, and he may not be ready yet to take that step.

It said the US government and Afghanistan share an interest in Pakistani authorities moving against terrorist sanctuaries and the Taliban’s Quetta Shura; arresting lawyers will not help in this regard.

“We are urging Musharraf to focus on keeping to the election schedule, completing the deal with Bhutto, and taking off his uniform. Although there are special interests that are seeking to extend the period for martial law, it must be kept short. If not, Musharraf’s interests and those of the Pakistani Army may begin to diverge. Karzai agreed the situation is complicated,” the cable said.

However, the Afghan president expressed hope that Musharraf’s extra-constitutional approach will work, but it was not clear to Karzai that Musharraf is ready to follow through in the short term on elections and a deal with Benazir Bhutto.

Karzai agreed that Iran is “busy.” It is seeking to undermine the US in Afghanistan, and it is trying to undermine development and reconstruction in western Afghanistan, the cable said.

The Afghan president asserted that Iran is bothered that Afghanistan is becoming an important transit hub for the region, and it wants to forestall Pakistani and Indian natural gas imports from Central Asia in order to protect its own market.

He emphasised that the issue of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan has to be solved, noting with dismay that the Taliban flag has been raised in three districts in Fata.

Karzai observed that while Afghanistan has a national identity and a weak state, Pakistan has a strong state with no coherent national identity. Noting that he had discussed Pakistan in his November 7 telephone call with President Bush, Karzai expressed hope that Musharraf’s imposition of extra-constitutional rule will work; Musharraf must be sincere because he has no further room for “more games.”

A plan for Afghanistan’s partition

Khalid Aziz

Faced with rising opposition at home, diminishing political support, increased casualties on the battlefield and growing reluctance of allies to continue with the war in Afghanistan, the United States is looking for a way to cut losses and reduce its presence in Afghanistan. Different solutions are advocated on how to contain the Taliban war machine after the drawdown of US forces. However, it is feared that suggested remedies may end up destabilising not only Afghanistan but much of Central and South Asia.

One proposal recently mooted is by a former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill. In his “Plan B: The de facto Partition of Afghanistan,” Blackwill argues that the best alternative for the US is a de facto partition of Afghanistan. According to this proposal, Afghanistan’s Pakhtun areas will be cordoned off from the rest of the country by a ring of garrisons that will act as fire-bases.

Blackwill thinks that such a division of Afghanistan will allow the Taliban and anti-Taliban forces to consume themselves. To conduct the military aspect of this plan, he advocates the retention of a 40,000-50,000 strong US force as compared to the existing 120,000. Blackwill suggests that the US should continue to target al Qaeda and the Taliban within the indicated ‘killing zone,’ and in their safe havens in Fata and other parts of Pakistan.

This plan has dangerous consequences. It would leave the Afghan Taliban in control of most of their historic stronghold in the south and the east. At the same time, regional powers like Russia and its former Central Asian Republics will form a ring to the North to prevent the outflow of violence towards the soft underbelly of Russia. If the Taliban break through this northern ring, then the situation in the Caucasus will change drastically to the detriment of Russia. The US hopes that Iran too will join this plan so that the Taliban are precluded from influencing the Afghan western and central provinces where there are Shia populations. This plan foresees the Chinese cooperating to prevent radicalisation of the Sinkiang (Xinjiang) region.

Blackwill advocates targeting the Taliban along Pakistan’s border. In other words the Afghan war will shift into Pakistan and thus have dangerous implications. Blackwill’s creation of a ‘killing zone’ in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan’s Pakhtuns in Fata, KP and Balochistan. The Durand Line that is the international border, extending some 2,240 kilometres dividing Pakistan from Afghanistan, will disappear as the killing zone extends east and southwards from Afghanistan. Therefore, the plan will not only strangle Afghanistan but also Pakistan.

If Blackwill’s policies are implemented, the existentialist threat to Pakistan will increase. The resulting chaos and violence may force the 40 million Pashtuns who reside in Pakistan to consider the dynamics of establishing a separate state. Given Pakistan’s ethnic fragility and simmering discontent in Balochistan, Blackwill’s prescription will destabilise Pakistan.

A larger risk is also inherent in the Blackwill plan. If the writ of the Pakistani state deteriorates, it is likely that Pakistani jihadi outfits will emerge as international agents in their own right. Their narrative will not be that of Pan-Islamism like Osama’s but more embedded in the subcontinental religious rivalry between Hindus and Muslims. Their obvious target will be India.

As local jihadi organisations emerge, they will direct their efforts against India. In the event of such a likelihood India will strike Pakistan. Pakistan, threatened with disintegration, will likely opt to use the nuclear option. In the absence of a US restraint as in December 2008, such a situation could lead to a nuclear Armageddon. On the other hand, India is fast developing into a future great power of the 21st century and thus has much more to lose from the Blackwill plan. This will force her to be more forbearing and patient. However, there is also a rabid anti-Pakistan lobby in India. How this insane hate-game will roll out is anyone’s guess. Pakistan must strategise early to prevent the actualisation of the Blackwill plan.

Continuity in a Time of Flux: Pakistan Army Chief’s Term Extended

By Reza Jan

Key Points:

The extension of Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s term by three years is the first by a democratic government in decades and amounts to a full second term for Gen. Kayani. Gen. Kayani will now retire in November 2013 and will outlast the terms of both Prime Minister Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari.

General Kayani guides Admiral Mullen on an aerial tour of Pakistan

Gen. Kayani has won high praise in Pakistan and the United States for his professionalism, ability to keep the army from interfering in politics, and for salvaging the army’s public image and morale from dangerous lows.

Gen. Kayani has overseen key transformations in the Pakistani military and has spearheaded new and widely lauded offensives against the Pakistani Taliban, including operations to retake the Swat valley in April 2009 and to clear South Waziristan of insurgents in October 2009.

Supporters of the extension for Kayani argue that the move maintains continuity of command in the Pakistani military during crucial phases in Pakistan’s operations against the Pakistani Taliban and during its military development and sustains lines of trust built up over the years between key actors in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States.

Critics retort that the extension disrupts regular promotion schedules, strengthens personality politics in the army (jeopardizing democratic revival), and maintains Pakistani military and intelligence aid to Afghan Taliban groups.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced on July 22 that, after consultation with President Asif Ali Zardari, he had decided to grant Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a three-year extension of his tenure. The announcement confirmed rumors that had been circulating since last year that Gilani would extend Gen. Kayani’s term.[1]

Unique situation

The extension means that Gen. Kayani will now retire in November 2013. This will make the army chief one of the longest serving principals in the country, as both the prime minister and the president are slated to complete their terms before his retirement (although they are eligible for re-election). This means Gen. Kayani will likely still be the army chief during the 2013 general election.[2]

Even though there was little doubt that Kayani’s term would be extended, the reappointment is unique for two reasons. First, it is the first time that a serving chief of the army has received a full term extension from a democratically elected civilian government (previous extensions have either been short-term arrangements, or given by military rulers to themselves).[3] General Abdul Waheed Kakar, the army chief during the late Benzair Bhutto’s second stint as prime minister, was also offered an extension, but declined to accept it.[4] Second, this is the first time that a democratically-elected civilian government in Pakistan has chosen to forego selecting an army chief of its own. The government is standing by the choice of the previous military government (Gen. Kayani was former president Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s choice of replacement).[5]

Accolades

Gen. Kayani has won high praise within Pakistan and from United States for transforming the fortunes of the army in a short amount of time. When Gen. Kayani inherited the position from President Pervez Musharraf in 2007, the popularity of the army as an institution had sunk to new lows, in large part because of its association with the increasingly unpopular rule of Gen. Musharraf.[6] The Red Mosque controversy, the disastrous peace deals, defeats at the hands of the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Swat valley, a new wave of suicide attacks across the country, and anger at the army’s political meddling all contributed to a swelling public resentment and a slide in troop morale. Gen. Kayani managed to salvage the army’s tarnished image and few in Pakistan would argue against his success. Public concern about extremism dropped in Pakistan between 2009 and 2010, the period in which the Pakistani military experienced success in its operations against the Taliban. In 2009, seventy-three percent expressed concern about extremism; only fifty-four percent did in 2010.[7]

Gen. Kayani is also hailed at home as a hero for turning around the war against the Pakistani Taliban.[8] Under Gen. Kayani’s stewardship, the Pakistani military launched decisive operations in the Swat valley and in South Waziristan, retaking territory that had served as safe havens for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan since 2007 and for related groups long before in the case of South Waziristan. Those operations, along with numerous other offensives across the FATA, have earned Gen. Kayani plaudits at home and abroad.[9]

Gen. Kayani launched programs to help salvage flagging troop morale even prior to turning around Pakistan’s war against its own militants. The army chief designated 2008 “The Year of the Soldier,” issuing a number of directives to try and better the conditions of the common soldiery, including vast pay increases for soldiers and frequent personal visits to soldiers serving in the field.[10] He designated 2009 “The Year of Training” during which the military launched a back-to-basics approach to increasing military professionalism. The army increased its training programs from the battalion level on up, culminating in the staging of the Azm-e-Nau III wargames in April 2010, the largest in Pakistan’s history.[11] The major military operations launched in 2009, no doubt benefitting from these army-wide programs, saw success that has further boosted troop morale.[12]

Perhaps among Gen. Kayani’s biggest accolades is the success he has had at keeping the army out of politics, at least overtly. He managed to keep the army from interfering in the 2008 general elections and, in January 2008, ordered all army officers to break and eschew contact with politicians.[13] Gen. Kayani also extricated hundreds of military officers from positions in government and civil service normally filled by civilians.[14] While Gen. Kayani has on occasion stepped in to referee major political disputes, it has usually been done discreetly, in keeping with his desire to maintain a low public profile.[15]

Impact

Many defense analysts and commentators in Pakistan, and diplomats and military officials in the United States, have commented favorably on Gen. Kayani’s extension.[16] They cite his professionalism, success against the Pakistani Taliban, excellent relations with his American counterparts, and the need for continuity of command during a critical time in Pakistan’s operations against the Taliban as the reasons for supporting Prime Minister Gilani’s announcement.

There has been, nonetheless, reasoned dissent among others. One of the primary concerns has been the disruption to promotion schedules that Gen. Kayani’s extension will cause. By granting Gen. Kayani a three-year extension, Gilani has conferred upon the army chief a full second term in the position, essentially denying the next generation of three-star officers a chance at filling the top slot. In practice, this affects only one general in particular. Lt. Gen. Khalid Shamim Wyne, the current Chief of General Staff, would have been the most senior officer at the time of Kayani’s retirement; Gen. Wyne will now retire before he would have the chance to serve as COAS.[17] There has been some talk of creating the position of Vice Chief of Army Staff for Gen. Wyne, but such a move has historically been viewed with skepticism within the army.[18] While there is the risk that such an extension could create misgivings among other senior generals, it is unlikely that such an offer was made or accepted without the broader agreement of the army’s Corps Commanders.[19]

Another issue of concern is what the extension represents for the progress of democracy in Pakistan. While it is a positive development that the extension was granted (at least superficially) by a civilian government, it does not speak well for the country’s democratic development if it continues to rely on strong personalities within the army. A six-year term army chief following so closely on the heels of Gen. Musharraf’s own nine years in power conjures up ghosts of an uncomfortable past. Gen. Kayani’s unique relationship with the United States is presented as an argument necessitating his continued presence and senior officials in U.S. military and policy circles have for some time championed granting Kayani an extension.[20] Critics argue, however, that this reinforces old U.S. policies of dealing with strong military personalities to the detriment of the ruling civilian government.

Lastly, there remains concern regarding the Pakistani military’s attitude towards the war in Afghanistan. Gen. Kayani has been lauded by his American allies for ramping up the Pakistani counterinsurgency campaign against the Pakistani Taliban and for purging officers with ties to militants, but the U.S. has privately expressed its disappointment that the Pakistani military has refused to distance itself from the Afghan Taliban, in particular the Haqqani network.[21] This concern is even more potent following the leak of classified U.S. military documents by WikiLeaks.org. Many of the leaked documents, prepared by lower-level U.S. military officers between 2004 and 2009, claim that the ISI provided high level strategic and tactical support to Afghan Taliban groups. In fact, according to the documents, much of the support was provided and expanded during Gen. Kayani’s time at the helm of the ISI from 2004-2007.[22]

Pakistan’s security policies, which would include historical support for militant groups, or lack thereof, are rarely the machinations of one man and usually are the result of a consensus among the senior-most members of the Pakistani officer corps. It is unlikely that Pakistan would undergo any dramatic shift in its external security policies even if Gen. Kayani were to retire on-time. The Pakistanis vehemently deny assisting the Afghan Taliban and claim that, if there is any support being rendered to the Taliban, it is by retired members of the ISI acting of their own devices and out of the control of the nation’s security apparatus (the U.S. has, on occasion, endorsed this claim).[23] If this is indeed the case, then support for the Afghan Taliban remains a factor insulated from whether Gen. Kayani stays or goes.

Conclusion

While concerns remain over the long-term negative impact of Gen. Kayani’s extension, there is much that might mitigate or override those fears. There is truth in the prime minister’s assertion that military operations in Pakistan are at a crucial stage. Gen. Kayani is overseeing not just major kinetic action against militants in Pakistan’s northwest and the stabilization of previous operations, but a larger transformation of the Pakistan Army in general. The army is in the midst of accounting for doctrinal changes by India’s military as well as sharpening its ability to fight guerrilla warfare against militants in the mountains. Furthermore, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is currently in a state of flux. Switching key actors during a period of stabilizing relations risks losing relationships that have been shaped over the course of years.

The same remains true of Gen. Kayani’s relationship with top commanders in Afghanistan. Gen. Kayani is respected, well-liked and has a good working relationship with both General David Petraeus and Admiral Mike Mullen.[24] Pakistani and U.S. military cooperation has increased dramatically under Gen. Kayani’s supervision and it is exactly that increased cooperation and trust building which could help shift Pakistani policy away from supporting enemy actors.[25] Cyril Almeida, an editor for Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper, aptly summed-up the situation by saying “Kayani is supposed to preside over the finest institution in the country and if he regards himself as indispensable, it cannot be read in a positive way….Having said that, clearly something is about to change in Afghanistan, and the army here feels need for continuity. He has understood the regional developments and has familiarity and dexterity of issues that might not exist in another officer right now.[26]“

While it is unfortunate that personalities are once again a seminal concern in U.S.-Pakistan relations, for better or for worse, the fact remains that Pakistan’s security policy is firmly within the domain of its army. Relying on such personalities to maintain a level of stability through this body at a key juncture in the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan is, perhaps, a necessary evil. While it may be too early to augur the effects of Gen. Kayani’s extension, there is little doubt that if an extension is seen as necessary, none could presently fill the role better than Gen. Kayani himself.

Pakistan starts resettling South Waziristan tribes

PESHAWAR, Pakistan – Pakistan on Sunday launched a process of resettling tens of thousands of tribesmen displaced in a major offensive in the Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan last year, officials said.

More than 40,000 families or some 300,000 people fled their homes

Pakistan’s military launched a sweeping offensive into South Waziristan last October aimed at wiping out the nerve centre of the main Taliban faction behind a wave of attacks that have killed about 3,400 people since July 2007.

The government has now set up two centres for registration of people who want to resume normal life in the rugged mountainous region, local administration official Mudassar Riaz Malik said.

More than 40,000 families or some 300,000 people fled their homes during the offensive in the area, which was known to shelter battle-hardened Uzbeks and Arabs with links to Al-Qaeda.

The military is now pursuing insurgents believed to have fled to the other six districts that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

South Waziristan’s displaced have mostly been staying with relatives, friends or in rented houses.

“The registration centres in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan towns started working today and the response was good,” Malik told AFP by telephone. The actual resettlement process will begin soon after registration is over, he said.

“We want to resettle all those who had been displaced,” he said adding that two more centres would be established to expedite the work.

The returnees will be provided with food and other essentials in addition to cash assistance to help in resettlement, he said.

The government offered to begin resettling displaced people earlier in the year but the tribespeople proved reluctant to move until the situation was completely stabilised, tribal sources said.

Malik said troops would remain in the area to ensure peace and security and would “stay there as long as needed”.

The military confirmed it was providing security for the process.

“It is a joint effort, we are involved in the repatriation process,” a military official said.

Taliban-ISI Report Makes No Sense

I finally got around to reading the new report by Mr Matt Waldman from London School of Economics. I could barely get through it without groaning. This is the quality of work coming out of LSE? Very disappointing. It seems like Mr Waldman is perhaps out to make a name for himself by writing sensational reports. Too bad it is so far fetched it’s hardly believable. Which left me wondering, what was the point?

The author of the report, Mr Matt Waldman, is a long-time opponent of the war in Afghanistan and has written for years predicting that military operations will fail in Afghanistan. While it certainly makes sense that there needs to be more focus on the needs of people in Afghanistan – and in our own tribal areas – reading his latest report, one cannot help but wonder if Mr Waldman’s view has not been unduly coloured by his own beliefs.

Almost all of the quotes that Waldman uses are from anonymous sources. That’s not surprising, but what is surprising is what he chooses to believe and disbelieve. Take for example the quote about how Zardari supposedly told Taliban leaders that ‘you are our people, we are your friends.’ Waldman accepts such an unlikely scenario without question. But read on to where his same sources tell him that the Americans are secretly funding the Taliban and he suddenly gets a case of incredulity saying, “Although this is not credible…”

Actually, this is not the first time that Waldman is forced to question the validity of what he is told. After a lengthy paragraph containing quotes from his Taliban sources claiming that they don’t want to kill innocents or blow up schools, but are forced to by the ISI, Waldman follows with, “Whether these assertions are true is debatable…” You don’t say.

Reading through the report, I was struck by how easy it would be to swap out ‘CIA’ for ‘ISI’ and the report could easily have been written by Zaid Hamid or any other conspiracy theorist. The evidence throughout the report is weak, at best. And to accept the reports findings one has to believe that for all intents and purposes, there is no Taliban. It is only ISI who is at work.

Really, though, can it be any surprise that Taliban sources – especially under the cloak of anonymity – are telling this naive gentleman that they are the real victims! That it is secretly ISI who is behind everything? How convenient!

I do not doubt that there are some ISI and MI elements who are supporting some jihadis. This is not so hard to imagine, and there is plenty of reason to believe it is so. But that is not what Mr Waldman suggests. Rather he is saying that it is official policy from the state of Pakistan – President on down to the ISI man in FATA – who is funding, organizing, planning, and carrying out terrorist attacks.

In order to believe this, you have to believe that all the military soliders who are being killed by Taliban are really just being killed by themselves. You have to believe that attacks on ISI and GHQ by Taliban are really carried out by ISI and military itself. You have to believe that the government is allowing drone attacks to kill itself. This is so stupid I don’t know how anyone can believe it. You would have to believe that the entire war is being done with Pakistan on both sides. Stupid.

I’m not the only one to see this silliness for what it is. Huma Imtiaz had a similar reaction:

Even though hating President Zardari might be a national pastime in Pakistan for many, this statement seems far-fetched, even to the most committed of his foes.First, it is hard to believe that the uber-secretive ISI would share such information with members of the civilian government. Secondly, even if ISI officials did take Pakistan’s civilian government into confidence, why would they take a civilian president to assure the Taliban of the ISI’s support? If they had to reassure the high-ranking Talibs, a more reassuring face would have been that of the ISI chief’s, or even the Chief of Army Staff’s.

President Zardari’s media adviser has already denied the allegations. Athar Abbas, head of the army’s PR wing, has termed it “rubbish.”

Secondly, what is rather unbelievable is that a majority of the Taliban members who are interviewed in the Waldman report despise the ISI. You begin to feel, based on their allegations that had it not been for the ISI’s pressure, they would happily give up their arms. While we have indeed seen anti-Pakistan statements from the Afghan government and from the Afghan people in recent years, it would have benefited the author to have interviewed at least a few former or current ISI members, as the report seems a rather one-sided account. And while I don’t discount the expertise of Ahmed Rashid or the Washington Post, citing their articles to prove a point that is on flimsy grounds to begin with does not help the veracity of this report.

Mosharraf Zaidi says that Mr Matt Waldman should be sued for libel. I can’t say I disagree. The author is no mere student who is perhaps misguided. This is a long-time professional who should absolutely know better than to publish such sensational nonsense. A man of his stature must know that the obvious result would be controversy, and he should be held responsible for his actions.

There are some real lingering problems with jihadi sympathizers both in groups like ISI and retired from the same. How does it do any good to solving these problems for such a report as Mr Waldman’s to be published. The only possible reason to do such a thing would seem to be an attempt to make a bad name for Pakistan so that we become isolated and left at the mercy of Talibans so that his country doesn’t have to make any more sacrifices. This might be a suitable answer for Mr Waldman who enjoys his luxurious home in the West. But for those of us who have to live with this Taliban monster on a day-to-day basis, it’s not such a fine answer.

License to kill w/o accountability!

FAROOQ HAMEED KHAN

In December 2009, President Obama authorised expansion of the drone war in parallel to the decision to send 30,000 more American troops to Afghanistan. The US defence budget for 2011 seeks a 75 percent increase in funds to enhance the drone operations. Armed with Hellfire missiles, the pilotless drones are the new weapons of choice in the US fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

What have the over 100 drone attacks in FATA achieved so far? Run by a bunch of trigger happy joy stick controllers from air-conditioned trailers in the Nevadan desert, this video game killed around 1,350 unarmed civilians with over 500 injured, though exact on-ground figures are feared to be much higher. Only 15 to 20 so-called high value Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets are claimed to be killed to date.

In 2009, the US had threatened to expand the drone attacks in Balochistan around Quetta to target the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura. This option was dispensed with, after a severe Pakistani response that any such step by the US would be considered as an act of war against Pakistan. However, the recent twin drone attacks in Khyber Agency, the first ever in close proximity to Peshawar, confirm that the US is implementing its threats of widening the drone campaign in Pakistan.

While there were 47 drone strikes in 2009 with 708 killed, this year has already seen 35 attacks causing 350 civilian deaths. More intensified drone strikes mean more innocent men, women and children are getting killed causing increased hatred against the US. Consequently, more young tribals line up to join their militant comrades with calls for revenge growing louder.

So when retaliation comes in the form of militants’ hit and run attacks against the US and NATO logistic convoys in FATA or Balochistan, the Americans get to taste the sweet Taliban revenge. But there again poor Pakistanis face the militants’ wrath and die for a worthless cause. In the recent devastating strike in Sangjani, only a few kilometres from Islamabad, the attackers not only reduced to ashes around 50 NATO trucks or trailers, but brutally killed over a dozen civilian truck drivers and cleaners.

On the positive side, the opposition to drone attacks is gaining momentum in the US. Congressman Dennis Kucinich asserted that the US was violating international law by carrying out strikes against a country that never attacked it. Peace activists under the CODEPINK banner regularly protest outside the Creech Air Force Base in Las Vegas, Nevada, from where drone missions are remotely guided.

Jeffrey Addicott, a former legal Adviser to US Special Forces and Director of the Centre for Terrorism Law in San Antonio, Texas, recently stated: “Some of the CIA operators are concerned that, because of its blowback effect, it is doing more harm than good.” He further added: “Because the drones kill innocent civilians and bystanders along with leaders from far away, they ‘infuriate the Muslim male’, thus making them more willing to join the movement.”

Pity the Pakistani nation that is kept in dark about whether the drones were taking off from its soil. However, Pakistanis seemed to slowly reconcile to the unfortunate reality that these unmanned, armed aerial vehicles may be operating from our own backyard to bomb our own people. In this context, when US Senator Diane Feinstein made the startling disclosure early last year, that these Predators were flown out of a Pakistani base, our leaders categorically denied it.

Indeed, one Washington Post’s report of September 2008 stated that while Pakistan “formally protests such actions as a violation of its sovereignty, the Pakistani government has generally looked the other way when the CIA conducted Predator missions or US troops responded to cross-border attacks by the Taliban.”

This fact notwithstanding, a former PAF Air Chief had declared that drones could be shot down if ordered by the government.
To what extent has Pakistan’s sovereignty been compromised in exchange for a few billion crispy US dollars? The nation has a right to know if there existed any secret agreement (about drones) between General Musharraf or President Zardari with the US administration.

Since the government has failed to protect its citizens, our only hope remains in the Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan. I believe that nobody can stop Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry from taking suo motu notice of the killings of helpless FATA civilians. So the CJ should order the government to make public any Pak-US agreement and stop these criminal attacks.

One cannot but condemn the reported statement of a veteran politician and our former Ambassador to USA, who talked about drone strikes in Punjab in the aftermath of the recent attacks on Ahmadi worship places in Lahore. Likewise, another senior ANP politician had also called for such drone attacks. Then why blame our enemies across the borders, when there is no dearth of the same within our ranks.

In a significant development this month, UN Human Rights investigator Philip Alston’s report questions the legality of CIA-directed drone attacks, calling them “a license to kill without accountability.” In a BBC interview, he stated: “My concern is that these drones, these Predators, are being operated in a framework which may well violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”

Alston, who is also the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, declared: “The US should explain the legal basis for attacking individuals with the remote-controlled aircraft.” Alston’s report criticised the United States for being, “the most prolific user of targeted killings” in the world. Does Alston’s report make the US guilty of crimes against humanity?

But how will history judge the Pakistani rulers who allowed foreign operated drones to kill their own people? Who should be held accountable for the killing of innocent Pakistani tribals? Can a corrupt and weak leadership safeguard the interests of its citizens? While our top rulers remain preoccupied in the extravaganzas of the Presidency and PM House, their countrymen get roasted in drone attacks almost daily.

From Gilgit to Karachi, the nation must rise to wipe off this stigma on our national dignity and sovereignty. Pakistan has a strong, moral and legitimate case to knock the doors of the UN Security Council, as well as the International Court of Justice, to stop this gory drama of death and destruction on our soil. If only our leadership stood up for the country’s honour!

Pakistan Army declares victory over Taliban in Orakzai

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan army declared victory Tuesday over the Taliban in one of their strongholds in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, saying the military operation in that region is finished.

The offensive in the Orakzai region came on the heels of a similar operation against the Pakistani Taliban militant network in the South Waziristan tribal area.
Many of the militants in South Waziristan were believed to have fled to Orakzai, which lies farther north.

The South Waziristan operation began on October 17, 2009 and ended in December 2009; the Orakzai operation then commenced on March 23, 2010, after the army declared the initiation of a large-scale clearance operation of the tribal agency. Many militants in South Waziristan were believed to have fled to Orakzai, though the top Pakistani Taliban leaders are believed to be in North Waziristan, an area the army has resisted attacking. Most analysts believe that the four-month gap between the two operations can be explained by clearance operations in Bajaur agency; Damadola was cleared and liberated on February 06, 2010, and Bajaur was “declared a conflict-free zone” on April 20, 2010. Maj. Gen. Tariq Khan, Inspector General of the Frontier Corps, stated that the paramilitary units deployed in the F.A.T.A. region were just waiting for the major operations – like Orakzai and North Waziristan – to finish, so that additional troops are available and a transformation in operational methodology could be implemented. “Instead of kinetic, concentrated operations, we start search and cordon and sting operations, for which actually you need more boots on the ground”, he said.

For months, the military pounded Orakzai with air strikes, eventually staging a ground operation as well. The offensive intensified in March, with the reported daily death tolls of suspected militants sometimes in the dozens. Some of the deadliest fighting was seen in May; on the 16th of May, PAF fighter jets and Army gunship helecopters attacked militant sanctuaries in the villages of Dabori, Gojar and Kamer Mela, killing 40 suspected insurgents, according to government sources in Orakzai. “Troops attacked militant hide-outs in Koul village, triggering clashes that killed 18 suspected insurgents. On 17th of May, it became known that the total number of dead militants had reached 60.

On Tuesday, Eighteen militants, some foreigners among them, were killed and six injured when military planes pounded their hideouts in upper Orakzai, security officials said. Sources said that militants were meeting at a hideout in Kot Kali area when they were hit by the planes. The officials said two hideouts had been destroyed.

The army said civilians who have fled Orakzai could expect to return home soon. More than 200,000 people are believed to have poured out of the area since the end of last year, while officials have put the death toll of militants in the hundreds.

The announcement was part of a military statement describing a visit to Orakzai and neighboring Kurram tribal regions by the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. ”(Kayani’s) visit to Orakzai Agency marks the successful conclusion of operations in the agency,” the statement said, adding, ”He appreciated the professional conduct of the operation which has cleared the agency of terrorists.” Gen. Kayani has made a customary point of visiting militant infested areas, where troops are engaged in fierce fighting with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP, to boost troop morale and to gain tactical insight of the battle-space and ground scenarios.