Posts Tagged ‘Military’

ISPR rejects NYT reports against Pakistan Army,ISI

July 11, 2011

RAWALPINDI: DG ISPR Major General Athar Abbas Saturday rejected the allegations leveled against the Army and ISI in series of ‘unsubstantiated’ news reports published by the American newspaper New York Times.

According to ISPR, DG ISPR during an interview with a foreign news agency said that in recent weeks the New York Times has continued to publish wild claims presented as news stories on the basis on information supposedly provided by unnamed US officials.

He added that in most cases such news reports have quoted anonymous US sources, bringing the veracity of their reporting into question.

Recalling NYT’s apology of March 2004 about some of its coverage of the Iraq war, General Abbas said at that time the newspaper had this to say: “In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in reexamining the claims as new evidence emerged-or failed to emerge”.

The Military Spokesman further said: “if the newspaper continues with its vilifying campaign without any concrete evidence, I am afraid at some point it may end up expressing its deep regret the way it did in the case of its Iraq coverage.

Big Picture

June 16, 2011

By: Fatima Rizvi
ZoneAsia-Pk

These days writing anything objective is futile. You will be branded a toady. If you can write a scathingly critical piece about the military you will be praised and considered a hero. Ex-military men writing in defense of their institution are ridiculed and ignored. Apart from trashing the military the other welcome topics are anti-US and anti-Government pieces though not quite as welcome as those that trash the military as an institution-and all because there have been lapses. What is needed is action to take care of those lapses and the longer this is delayed the more the media frenzy will increase.

The NYT June 15 article by its Islamabad correspondent takes the cake. The caption ‘Army Chief Fighting for his Job’ says it all. No one sees the Army Chief fighting for his job. Whom is he fighting? He is there firm in the saddle and doing what he has to do. The Army is run by consensus?-since when? The Army is not run by consensus-never was and never will be-in fact it cannot be. How is it unusual for an Army Chief to go around addressing officers and men after serious events or even as a routine? All Army Chiefs have done this. It is important to do so. The questions asked are the best part of the interaction—no punches are pulled and the discussion is open and frank. What is so significant about this? The bit about an unlikely but possible ‘Colonels Coup’ is truly mind boggling. This is a cohesive, integrated, professional fighting force and such thoughts about it are what create anger. Ant There is anger-against the US, against the US media for what it is doing, against the Pakistani media and against the blabbermouths who forget who they are talking to and how their utterances will be used to form opinions like the one in the NYT article.

Read Complete Article: http://www.zoneasia-pk.com/ZoneAsia-Pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4894:the-big-picture&catid=70:free-talk&Itemid=84

Musharraf’s strategic blindness

January 7, 2011

By: Khalid Aziz

It was sad to read a recent article in this newspaper published on December 14, by former President Musharraf, regarding the war on terror and what needed to be done in Afghanistan. One does not expect Pakistani leaders to be learned in policy; however, one does expect that they should at least be honest in their diagnosis.

Musharraf begins his analysis by incorrectly stating that the jihad against the Soviets was launched by the Afghans. The jihad was launched by the US and Pakistan jointly and the operational policy was under President Ziaul Haq, who used the ISI for its implementation through the Jamaat-e-Islami.

The jihad was engineered to be spearheaded by the religious leadership and not the traditional Afghan elders because we chose for it to be that way. By using the Jamaat-e-Islami to create the infrastructure for jihad in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab world, Zia obtained legitimacy for his unconstitutional rule; resources for modernising the military by the US; and treasure for those conducting the jihad. In return, he jeopardised Pakistan’s future.

Of the 21 spontaneous Afghan uprisings against the Soviet invasion in 1978-79, 18 were led by traditional Afghan elders and only three by religious leaders. After the CIA contracted the ISI to manage the jihad, it was decided by General Zia to obtain the services of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami for creating infrastructure. The Jamaat, in turn, linked with the Egyptian Ikhwanul-Muslimeen to obtain recruits, funds and fatwas from the Arab world for jihad. Thus began a cycle of radicalisation for the Afghan jihad in the Arab world that pulled in plenty of Arabian acolytes and future jihad philosophers like Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yousaf Azzam.

This group of Islamic warriors were choreographed by the ISI under its then DG, General Akhtar Abdur Rehman. These jihadis not only became an extension of Pakistani military and the CIA, but their off the record services were also used as far away as Bosnia and against the USSR in the Caucasus; in one instance, the USSR delivered a warning to President Reagan of an attack on Pakistan for Pakistan’s involvement in a raid by jihadis against chemical plants in Uzbekistan.

During the jihad, various protagonists pumped $66 billion worth of weaponry into the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan – it comes to a mind-boggling more than $20 million per Pakhtun! At the same time, the CIA and the Pakistani intelligence services got involved in the nebulous world of creating off the record incomes from drug trafficking to finance illegal operations.

Pakistan was thus crippled by weapons and drugs – something that General Musharraf accepts in his autobiography. He should also have been brave to apportion the major share of this institutional failure to his service. The import of weapons and drugs had official patronage, and it tore the fabric of society in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the closing stages of the Geneva peace talks on Afghanistan in 1986-87, President Gorbachev begged the US and Pakistan for a peaceful transition that would maintain the state in Afghanistan. We were unrelenting; even when the weak Prime Minister Junejo signed the Geneva Agreement, by-passing General Zia, he was sacked unceremoniously.

An important indicator of the baggage that we inherited from General Zia was that, whereas in 1971 there were only 900 madrassas in Pakistan, when he died there were 8,000 registered and 25,000 unregistered madrassas. As Afghanistan slips into another civil war, let us keep Pakistan out of it and not get involved, as Musharraf prescribes. This time our involvement will destroy us.

VVIP security: Key politicians trust only personal guards

January 6, 2011

By: Zia Khan

ISLAMABAD: A majority of top politicians do not trust state agencies for their security and rely on personal arrangements, officials in political parties said a day after Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer was assassinated by an elite police commando.


President, Nawaz Sharif and Maulana Fazlur Rehman all use their trusted men.

Those who prefer their loyalists for security arrangements include President Asif Ali Zardari, former premier Nawaz Sharif and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman.

Pakistan Muslim League-Q chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Awami National Party (ANP) president Asfandyar Wali Khan also have their personal guards, although personnel of state agencies are at their disposal too.

Officials said an entrenched mistrust in the political leadership is behind the practice of preferring party affiliates over state security.

“If there were any doubts, they must have been removed after the way Taseer was gunned down by his own security guard,” an official in the PPP said.

At least three state agencies – the military, police and Intelligence Bureau (IB) – take care of presidential security. A chief security officer from the military and three from the police are responsible for the president’s security at his official residence and during visits to other places. The official added that Zardari’s personal guards are at the forefront of both intelligence and security arrangements at the presidency and during trips to other areas, especially when he addresses public rallies.

The PPP formed a force to protect former slain premier Benazir Bhutto when she returned to Pakistan in October 2007 after almost a decade of self-imposed exile. A number of party members were killed during a failed and a successful bid on her life. The remaining are now on duty again with the president and some other stalwarts of the ruling party.

Sharif family:

“Call it mistrust, call it watchfulness, a small group of personal loyalists lead Mian Sahib’s security detail wherever he goes,” an official from Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz said.

A long term affiliate Abdul Shakoor leads Nawaz’s personal security entourage. “Under him (Shakoor) personal guards remain alert whether Mian Sahib is at his residence in Raiwind or visits other cities. Even during air travel, the squad accompanies him,” the official added on condition of anonymity.

An associate of the Sharif family said Nawaz keeps changing officials of police and other law enforcement agencies deployed for his security, but his personal guards are the same since he returned to Pakistan after his 10-year exile in 2007.

Several other national and nationalist leaders from Balochistan to Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa have their personal arrangements for security that indicates their mistrust of state protocol. More than 180 million Pakistanis, however, do not seem to have any other option-state security is not good enough to protect them and they cannot afford anything else.

Word Games

November 24, 2010

By: Fatima Rizvi

The name of the game is doing everything and anything to gain an advantage. Blame others, cheat, scandalize, accuse, lie, fabricate-so long as you do in someone and get ahead. This is driving media debates, news, court cases, investigations and gossip. Ambassador Holbrooke, on his last visit commented on Musharaff by saying that ‘he had as much chance as Gorbachev of coming back’ and that ‘if he had done what he had promised to the US he would have been still around’. The sycophants who surround the former President swung into action – they said that this (Holbrooke’s statement) was proof that Musharraf had refused to do what the US wanted him to do and that he had put Pakistan’s interests first. Also that he had distanced himself from US when he found out that their policy was at odds with Pakistan’s.

No one believed any of this, but why pass up a chance to outwit someone – even if it is your benefactor!

Read Complete Article: http://www.zoneasia-pk.com/ZoneAsia-Pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2639:word-games&catid=70:free-talk&Itemid=84

The elite SSG Commando Force of Pakistan

October 6, 2010

Elete_SSG.JPG

SSG Training and the Commando Course are not easy. It requires real commitment and determination, Elite SSG Commando force of Pakistan army protecting Pakistan’s border with honour. these brave heart Commandos of the Special services Group, are the pride of pakistan army and nation.

Ayub Khan’s letter to Adm Radford (1955)

August 17, 2010

The US can blame Pakistan for double-dealing all it wants; but Pakistan knows that the US has been reneging on its official promises ever since Pakistan made the mistake of entering the Western orbit

This declassified letter from Gen. Ayub Khan shows how the United States has been double-dealing Pakistan more than FIFTY YEARS AGO!

Continuity in a Time of Flux: Pakistan Army Chief’s Term Extended

August 11, 2010

By Reza Jan

Key Points:

The extension of Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s term by three years is the first by a democratic government in decades and amounts to a full second term for Gen. Kayani. Gen. Kayani will now retire in November 2013 and will outlast the terms of both Prime Minister Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari.


General Kayani guides Admiral Mullen on an aerial tour of Pakistan

Gen. Kayani has won high praise in Pakistan and the United States for his professionalism, ability to keep the army from interfering in politics, and for salvaging the army’s public image and morale from dangerous lows.

Gen. Kayani has overseen key transformations in the Pakistani military and has spearheaded new and widely lauded offensives against the Pakistani Taliban, including operations to retake the Swat valley in April 2009 and to clear South Waziristan of insurgents in October 2009.

Supporters of the extension for Kayani argue that the move maintains continuity of command in the Pakistani military during crucial phases in Pakistan’s operations against the Pakistani Taliban and during its military development and sustains lines of trust built up over the years between key actors in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States.

Critics retort that the extension disrupts regular promotion schedules, strengthens personality politics in the army (jeopardizing democratic revival), and maintains Pakistani military and intelligence aid to Afghan Taliban groups.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced on July 22 that, after consultation with President Asif Ali Zardari, he had decided to grant Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a three-year extension of his tenure. The announcement confirmed rumors that had been circulating since last year that Gilani would extend Gen. Kayani’s term.[1]

Unique situation

The extension means that Gen. Kayani will now retire in November 2013. This will make the army chief one of the longest serving principals in the country, as both the prime minister and the president are slated to complete their terms before his retirement (although they are eligible for re-election). This means Gen. Kayani will likely still be the army chief during the 2013 general election.[2]

Even though there was little doubt that Kayani’s term would be extended, the reappointment is unique for two reasons. First, it is the first time that a serving chief of the army has received a full term extension from a democratically elected civilian government (previous extensions have either been short-term arrangements, or given by military rulers to themselves).[3] General Abdul Waheed Kakar, the army chief during the late Benzair Bhutto’s second stint as prime minister, was also offered an extension, but declined to accept it.[4] Second, this is the first time that a democratically-elected civilian government in Pakistan has chosen to forego selecting an army chief of its own. The government is standing by the choice of the previous military government (Gen. Kayani was former president Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s choice of replacement).[5]

Accolades

Gen. Kayani has won high praise within Pakistan and from United States for transforming the fortunes of the army in a short amount of time. When Gen. Kayani inherited the position from President Pervez Musharraf in 2007, the popularity of the army as an institution had sunk to new lows, in large part because of its association with the increasingly unpopular rule of Gen. Musharraf.[6] The Red Mosque controversy, the disastrous peace deals, defeats at the hands of the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Swat valley, a new wave of suicide attacks across the country, and anger at the army’s political meddling all contributed to a swelling public resentment and a slide in troop morale. Gen. Kayani managed to salvage the army’s tarnished image and few in Pakistan would argue against his success. Public concern about extremism dropped in Pakistan between 2009 and 2010, the period in which the Pakistani military experienced success in its operations against the Taliban. In 2009, seventy-three percent expressed concern about extremism; only fifty-four percent did in 2010.[7]

Gen. Kayani is also hailed at home as a hero for turning around the war against the Pakistani Taliban.[8] Under Gen. Kayani’s stewardship, the Pakistani military launched decisive operations in the Swat valley and in South Waziristan, retaking territory that had served as safe havens for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan since 2007 and for related groups long before in the case of South Waziristan. Those operations, along with numerous other offensives across the FATA, have earned Gen. Kayani plaudits at home and abroad.[9]

Gen. Kayani launched programs to help salvage flagging troop morale even prior to turning around Pakistan’s war against its own militants. The army chief designated 2008 “The Year of the Soldier,” issuing a number of directives to try and better the conditions of the common soldiery, including vast pay increases for soldiers and frequent personal visits to soldiers serving in the field.[10] He designated 2009 “The Year of Training” during which the military launched a back-to-basics approach to increasing military professionalism. The army increased its training programs from the battalion level on up, culminating in the staging of the Azm-e-Nau III wargames in April 2010, the largest in Pakistan’s history.[11] The major military operations launched in 2009, no doubt benefitting from these army-wide programs, saw success that has further boosted troop morale.[12]

Perhaps among Gen. Kayani’s biggest accolades is the success he has had at keeping the army out of politics, at least overtly. He managed to keep the army from interfering in the 2008 general elections and, in January 2008, ordered all army officers to break and eschew contact with politicians.[13] Gen. Kayani also extricated hundreds of military officers from positions in government and civil service normally filled by civilians.[14] While Gen. Kayani has on occasion stepped in to referee major political disputes, it has usually been done discreetly, in keeping with his desire to maintain a low public profile.[15]

Impact

Many defense analysts and commentators in Pakistan, and diplomats and military officials in the United States, have commented favorably on Gen. Kayani’s extension.[16] They cite his professionalism, success against the Pakistani Taliban, excellent relations with his American counterparts, and the need for continuity of command during a critical time in Pakistan’s operations against the Taliban as the reasons for supporting Prime Minister Gilani’s announcement.

There has been, nonetheless, reasoned dissent among others. One of the primary concerns has been the disruption to promotion schedules that Gen. Kayani’s extension will cause. By granting Gen. Kayani a three-year extension, Gilani has conferred upon the army chief a full second term in the position, essentially denying the next generation of three-star officers a chance at filling the top slot. In practice, this affects only one general in particular. Lt. Gen. Khalid Shamim Wyne, the current Chief of General Staff, would have been the most senior officer at the time of Kayani’s retirement; Gen. Wyne will now retire before he would have the chance to serve as COAS.[17] There has been some talk of creating the position of Vice Chief of Army Staff for Gen. Wyne, but such a move has historically been viewed with skepticism within the army.[18] While there is the risk that such an extension could create misgivings among other senior generals, it is unlikely that such an offer was made or accepted without the broader agreement of the army’s Corps Commanders.[19]

Another issue of concern is what the extension represents for the progress of democracy in Pakistan. While it is a positive development that the extension was granted (at least superficially) by a civilian government, it does not speak well for the country’s democratic development if it continues to rely on strong personalities within the army. A six-year term army chief following so closely on the heels of Gen. Musharraf’s own nine years in power conjures up ghosts of an uncomfortable past. Gen. Kayani’s unique relationship with the United States is presented as an argument necessitating his continued presence and senior officials in U.S. military and policy circles have for some time championed granting Kayani an extension.[20] Critics argue, however, that this reinforces old U.S. policies of dealing with strong military personalities to the detriment of the ruling civilian government.

Lastly, there remains concern regarding the Pakistani military’s attitude towards the war in Afghanistan. Gen. Kayani has been lauded by his American allies for ramping up the Pakistani counterinsurgency campaign against the Pakistani Taliban and for purging officers with ties to militants, but the U.S. has privately expressed its disappointment that the Pakistani military has refused to distance itself from the Afghan Taliban, in particular the Haqqani network.[21] This concern is even more potent following the leak of classified U.S. military documents by WikiLeaks.org. Many of the leaked documents, prepared by lower-level U.S. military officers between 2004 and 2009, claim that the ISI provided high level strategic and tactical support to Afghan Taliban groups. In fact, according to the documents, much of the support was provided and expanded during Gen. Kayani’s time at the helm of the ISI from 2004-2007.[22]

Pakistan’s security policies, which would include historical support for militant groups, or lack thereof, are rarely the machinations of one man and usually are the result of a consensus among the senior-most members of the Pakistani officer corps. It is unlikely that Pakistan would undergo any dramatic shift in its external security policies even if Gen. Kayani were to retire on-time. The Pakistanis vehemently deny assisting the Afghan Taliban and claim that, if there is any support being rendered to the Taliban, it is by retired members of the ISI acting of their own devices and out of the control of the nation’s security apparatus (the U.S. has, on occasion, endorsed this claim).[23] If this is indeed the case, then support for the Afghan Taliban remains a factor insulated from whether Gen. Kayani stays or goes.

Conclusion

While concerns remain over the long-term negative impact of Gen. Kayani’s extension, there is much that might mitigate or override those fears. There is truth in the prime minister’s assertion that military operations in Pakistan are at a crucial stage. Gen. Kayani is overseeing not just major kinetic action against militants in Pakistan’s northwest and the stabilization of previous operations, but a larger transformation of the Pakistan Army in general. The army is in the midst of accounting for doctrinal changes by India’s military as well as sharpening its ability to fight guerrilla warfare against militants in the mountains. Furthermore, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is currently in a state of flux. Switching key actors during a period of stabilizing relations risks losing relationships that have been shaped over the course of years.

The same remains true of Gen. Kayani’s relationship with top commanders in Afghanistan. Gen. Kayani is respected, well-liked and has a good working relationship with both General David Petraeus and Admiral Mike Mullen.[24] Pakistani and U.S. military cooperation has increased dramatically under Gen. Kayani’s supervision and it is exactly that increased cooperation and trust building which could help shift Pakistani policy away from supporting enemy actors.[25] Cyril Almeida, an editor for Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper, aptly summed-up the situation by saying “Kayani is supposed to preside over the finest institution in the country and if he regards himself as indispensable, it cannot be read in a positive way….Having said that, clearly something is about to change in Afghanistan, and the army here feels need for continuity. He has understood the regional developments and has familiarity and dexterity of issues that might not exist in another officer right now.[26]“

While it is unfortunate that personalities are once again a seminal concern in U.S.-Pakistan relations, for better or for worse, the fact remains that Pakistan’s security policy is firmly within the domain of its army. Relying on such personalities to maintain a level of stability through this body at a key juncture in the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan is, perhaps, a necessary evil. While it may be too early to augur the effects of Gen. Kayani’s extension, there is little doubt that if an extension is seen as necessary, none could presently fill the role better than Gen. Kayani himself.

US Army Private Accused of WikiLeak

August 2, 2010

By: Megan Friedman

Pfc. Bradley Manning has been accused of leaking classified material to secret-sharing site WikiLeaks, and has been transferred from Kuwait to a military brig in Virginia.


Wikileaks founder Julian Assange holds up a copy of a newspaper during a press conference

Manning, 22, has been charged with violating eight violations of the U.S. Criminal Code, according to CNN. He will remain in confinement until the Army decides whether he should face a military trial.

According to CNN’s source, Manning is accused of logging into a top-secret internet system that provides access to classified e-mails and documents.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan has seen its deadliest month for U.S. troops, with a death toll of 63 and climbing for July. So perhaps a document leak isn’t the biggest of the military’s problems.

Leaked documents show daily toll of enemy ambushes

July 28, 2010

Washington — Leaked military messages published by WikiLeaks.org reveal a strategic pattern of hit-and-run ambushes by enemy forces operating in Afghanistan — attacks that the U.S.-led military coalition began to treat as a routine occurrence.

The material details more than 530 separate incidents of ambush-style assaults. While likely only a fraction of the total number of such attacks, taken together they show U.S. and its coalition partners, along with a variety of Afghan military and security branches, were mostly helpless to prevent or anticipate them, which occurred across the Afghan theater of fighting.

CNN has been unable to confirm that the documents are authentic.

The summer of 2009 was a particularly busy time according to the documents, as the new Obama administration had begun stepping up the American military presence in Afghanistan. The month of August included almost daily accounts of ambushes, written in the typical dispassionate, acronym-heavy summaries.

A typical example was August 5, 2009, when U.S. forces reported receiving small-arms fire from a populated compound. At least two enemy gunmen were seen “moving in and out of qulats [compounds].” An update 17 minutes later indicates “the fire has ceased and the qulats they were taking fire from now have women and children outside of them. Also report have sniper team set up overwatching the qulats.”

The gunmen had apparently vanished, and U.S. air support was brought in as a precaution. The only injury was a sprained ankle to one Coalition soldier.

A day later, a coalition foot patrol came under attack from at least “5 individuals firing heavy weapons and began returning fire with 120mm mortars.” The enemy reportedly was carrying old Soviet-style heavy anti-aircraft machine guns and Kalashnikov assault weapons. As was typical of such assaults, the “AAF [anti-Afghanistan forces] broke contact and ceased firing on the patrol.”

No injuries or captures of enemy forces were reported.

Attacks on coalition troops were relatively rare. Most of the enemy ambushes listed involved Afghan military and government forces, as well as possible “soft” targets such as international aid workers and diplomatic personnel.

One of the most deadly was noted in June 2004. The enemy, according to one message from the WikiLeaks file, “ambushed the car of an aid worker organization in Badghis province, killing all five occupants. Members of the Taliban have claimed responsibility for the attack. Assessment of the crime scene determined that two attackers committed the ambush while traveling on a motorcycle. They used an AK-47 and a pistol. They did not rob the vehicle.”

The report does not indicate who was attacked, but it appears to be staff working for Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), a doctors’ aid group. The five civilians were killed on the road between Khairkhana and Qala i Naw, and the incident resulted in the complete withdrawal of MSF from Afghanistan.

The coalition military assessment raises some questions whether the Taliban was actually involved in this episode, and one local intelligence source told the coalition the attack occurred during the harvest season for poppy seeds, used to make opium, so it may have been drug-related. Nevertheless, the report concludes, “the United Nations and Afghan Non-government Organization Security Organization (ANSO) have recommended that all routes in Qadis District be considered high risk at this time, and all Badghis routes are at elevated risk due to the poppy harvest.”

As that incident showed, motorcycles were a favored vehicle on such hit-and-run ambushes. Dozens of such attacks noted usually two gunmen on the motorized two-wheelers, one of them firing a weapon into another larger vehicle.

A May 1, 2007, message reported the “Czech Republic Ambassador [and his entourage] was under attack. They received SAF [small arms fire] and RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] fire” in the Zurmat District of Afghanistan. The Czechs were “barricaded in a house with a green door with 2 of the ambassador’s bodyguards, both of whom were wounded. They were instructed to wait for assistance” until coalition and Afghan forces could arrive to assist.

The group was eventually rescued with no one seriously hurt. But four Afghan National Army soldiers who had arrived to help were killed in the subsequent fighting with insurgents. Three of the enemy were captured.

Most of the ambushes listed in the WikiLeaks material appeared to be related to destroying or stealing goods and equipment.

A May 2004 incident report detailed how the Waza Khwa police chief and 20 of his officers were ambushed “with 6 jingle trucks loaded with CERP [Commander's Emergency Response Program] that the [local tribal] governor had given them. The engagement lasted 30 minutes. The police chief feels that the enemy force was about 20 personnel on motorcycles.” The police chief also said two of his officers were killed, one wounded. All of the insurgents apparently escaped unharmed. U.S. forces were too far away to react, the report concludes.

“Jingle trucks” are colorful transport vehicles typical of the Central Asia region, so named for the bright paint jobs and the chimes, chains, or pendants that often adorn the fenders.

And CERP refers to a U.S. military program allowing individual commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility.

Financial profit was not the only apparent goal of insurgent ambushes. In another incident from December 2006, U.S. forces were informed that “three local national tractor trailers were stopped. They appeared to have been ambushed and vandalized. The vehicles were carrying civilian leased equipment (bucket loader, road grader, skid steer and a hydraulic excavator).” The drivers reported that Taliban forces attacked as the convoy headed from Sharana to Ghanzi. Some of the equipment was burned and strafed with bullet holes. Most of the drivers escaped “except for one driver and one tractor truck that the Taliban took hostage and is now demanding a ransom.”

The message does not indicated how the incident was resolved.

In one of the few instances were the U.S.-led coalition anticipated an ambush, military officials in March 2007 summarized an apparent intelligence report. “The Taliban leadership in Tagab Valley believed there were Coalition and GOA [government of Afghanistan] forces in Sherkhel village… while these forces are in transit, the Taliban plan to attack them with an unknown number of fighters.”

Again, the “imminent threat” message does not indicate whether such an attack occurred and whether coalition forces were prepared to counter the enemy.


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